An evaluation of the impact upon productivity of ending resale price maintenance on books by Ball, C. et al.
  
 
 
An evaluation of the impact 
upon productivity of ending 
resale price maintenance on 
books 
 
February  2008  
 
 
Report prepared for the OFT by the Centre for Competition 
Policy at University of East Anglia 
 
 
 
 
OFT981 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Crown copyright 2008 
This publication (excluding the OFT logo) may be reproduced free of charge in 
any format or medium provided that it is reproduced accurately and not used in 
a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as crown copyright 
and the title of the publication specified. 
 
 
Report prepared for the OFT by the Centre for Competition Policy at University of East Anglia 
FOREWORD 
This report was commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) from the 
Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia. The team from 
University of East Anglia was asked to examine how the ending of resale price 
maintenance on Books in 1997 affected productivity in book publishing and 
retailing.  
Any views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the OFT nor the legal position under existing 
competition law which the OFT applies in exercise of its competition law 
enforcement functions. 
This report is part of the OFT's Economic Discussion Paper series, and is 
intended to inform current discussion within the competition policy community 
in the UK about cooperation between purchasers. If you would like to comment 
on the paper, please write to me, Amelia Fletcher, at the address below. The 
OFT welcomes suggestions for future research topics on all aspects of UK 
competition and consumer policy. 
 
Dr Amelia Fletcher 
Chief Economist 
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London EC4Y 8JX 
amelia.fletcher@oft.gsi.gov.uk 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) is the practice whereby upstream 
manufacturer(s) control the prices of their products when sold by downstream 
distributors. An example is the Net Book Agreement (NBA): from approximately 
1900, publishers used the NBA to restrict the retail price of books in the UK, 
thus preventing retailers from selling a book under the publisher's chosen (net) 
price. Any retailer that deviated from the agreement would be refused the 
supply of future books by all publishers. This collective nature of the 
enforcement of the NBA constituted a particularly strong example of RPM.  
By the mid-1990s this practice had started to break down in part due to 
significant changes occurring in the industry and in 1997 it was formally ended 
by the Restrictive Practises Court. Thus by the mid 1990s a new era in which 
booksellers were free to choose their prices had begun. 
Our research has had two objectives:  
• using the abolition of the Net Book Agreement as a case study, to 
assess the impact of a competition policy intervention on 
productivity 
• to develop and assess a methodology which is appropriate not only 
for this particular case study but also more generally when assessing 
the impact of competition policy interventions. 
This summary focuses on the key results of the report (as contained in chapters 
6-10), and our chosen methodology (as derived and discussed in chapters 4 and 
5). Chapters 1-3 provide a descriptive background on the history of RPM in 
Britain and other countries, and draw out some theoretical expectations 
concerning the likely positive impact of abolition of RPM on productivity. These 
are not summarised here, except to highlight that this study makes a novel 
empirical contribution to the existing literature. Very little has been documented, 
in general, about the relationship between RPM (or its abolition) and the entry of 
new firms.  In this case, however, we shall see that the abolition of RPM was 
accompanied by the entry, and rapid growth, of some significant new players – 
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general supermarkets and internet sellers. This entry has had a major impact on 
the subsequent evolution of the industry.   
The effects on productivity of the abolition of NBA 
We consider the impact of removing RPM on book retailing and publishing in 
turn.  The more striking results are for retailing. 
Book retailing 
 
Without doubt, the most significant development in the structure of UK book 
retailing in the last decade, and a significant driver of change, has been the rapid 
growth in market shares of internet sellers (notably Amazon) and the one-stop 
grocery supermarket chains (especially Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury). A helpful 
way of prefacing our main findings on productivity is to start with some simple 
prior theoretical expectations.  The expected story might run as follows. In 
general, the abolition of RPM should facilitate the entry of any low cost firms. 
Insofar as they employ new, low cost (and therefore high productivity) business 
models, their success requires, in large part, that these entrants are able to gain 
market share by passing on their lower costs in lower prices to the consumer. 
Their ability to do so is obviously severely constrained in any market where 
prices are regulated, as is the case with RPM, and the abolition of RPM should 
be a powerful catalyst in speeding up such entry. A beneficial effect on industry 
productivity then follows almost automatically – as high productivity entrants 
gain market share at the expense of low productivity incumbents, the aggregate 
average industry productivity must rise. This would then be a classic example of 
the 'between-firm effect'. In addition, a second beneficial effect is also 
anticipated. With the growth of these high productivity entrants, competitive 
pressure should increase on the traditional bricks and mortar (B&M) incumbents. 
One might then expect these incumbents to respond by striving to lower their 
own costs and raise their own productivity.  This would then be a positive 
within-firm productivity effect. This effect would be reinforced if both types of 
firm were driven to further ongoing improvements as the competitive process 
unfolds. 
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Headline results   
 
As expected, the entry of the supermarkets and internet sellers entrants (now 
with a combined market share of more than 20 per cent) has made a positive 
contribution to industry productivity via the between firm effect. The exact 
magnitude of this effect is difficult to quantify in practice due to the absence of 
any hard and disaggregated estimates of their productivity in books alone (as 
opposed to for all products).  However, on not unreasonable assumptions, this 
effect alone may have increased industry productivity by as much as a third in 
just five years (2001-05), but a more conservative estimate would be about 20 
per cent.1   
• We have found no hard evidence on whether supermarkets and 
internet sellers have further increased their productivity over this 
period, but, given the scope for learning, as they finesse their 
business models as applied to book selling, we would also expect 
there to have been positive subsequent within-firm productivity gains 
for these firms. 
• Contrary to the expectations in the previous paragraph, there has 
been no long-run improvement in the within-firm productivity of the 
B&M incumbent retailers. On the contrary, they have suffered 
serious negative within-firm productivity changes. This has had the 
effect of depressing aggregate productivity growth by between 10 
and 16 per cent. 
• Combining the two effects, it is difficult to estimate the net outcome 
in aggregate industry productivity – precisely because of the 
uncertainties about the true productivity of the new entrants. The 
most likely outcome is that the two effects have very broadly offset 
each other. 
                                     
1  These estimates are drawn from Table 8.9 below.   
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Discussion  
These results prompt two key questions. First, why have the B&M retailers 
failed to respond more positively, in terms of productivity, to competitive new 
entry and, secondly, to what extent did the ending of RPM create the entry that 
has been observed? 
At face value, the limited response of B&M retailers would appear to vindicate 
the supporters of retaining NBA, when they argued that abolition of NBA would 
seriously jeopardise the smaller independent retailers, who would be unable to 
survive in the face of discounting competitors. In fact, it is not just the 
independents, but also the much larger chains, such as Waterstone's who have 
been apparently unable to counter the challenge of new entrants. However, 
close examination of the full picture post-1997 reveals more complexity. In the 
years immediately after and before formal abolition, when the NBA was already 
beginning to collapse, the larger B&M retailers in fact posted quite impressive 
improvements in their within-firm productivity.2 The problems only really started 
to emerge as their turnover subsequently began to fall as a consequence of the 
growth of the entrants. Figure A illustrates the impact of entry into the market 
on the turnover of incumbents. 
                                     
2  The fact that these gains started to emerge even before formal abolition confirms what 
informed opinion has told us, namely that the change should not be identified too literally with 
the exact date of the formal abolition of the institution. 
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Figure A: Total nominal turnover for a sample of selected UK B&M 
retailers and the book industry overall 2000–2005     
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This implies that it was a short-term inability to downsize and consolidate, in 
line with declining output that was the cause of their falling productivity. 
Certainly, the role of efficiency in the stated motives for the recent 
Waterstone's-Ottakar's merger point in this direction.3 It was argued that the 
merger would help their competitive response to the 'pincer movement' caused 
by intense supermarket and internet competition. This, somewhat belated, 
response suggests that short- to medium-term factor rigidities and adjustment 
costs may mean that, in some cases, it may be many years before relatively low 
productivity incumbents are able to increase their productivity in response to 
new competitive pressures. 
What is clear is the impact that a wave of entry had on the market. The second 
question referred to is whether this entry of supermarkets and internet sellers 
only became possible once NBA was abolished. It is impossible to assert 
                                     
3 The efficiency defence, offered by the parties, suggested that there would be important 
efficiency gains from integrating Waterstone's superior stock management system into 
Ottakar's operations (Competition Commission, 2006, p.13).   
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causality with absolute confidence, and it is probably overstatement to suggest 
that their entry would literally not have occurred without abolition. Rather, the 
real issue is whether their entry would have been so successful, and had such 
striking consequences for industry productivity), had RPM been retained. It is 
clear that both supermarkets and internet sellers offer consumers important non-
price benefits of convenience (for both supermarkets and internet sellers) and 
deep range (internet sellers), and these would still apply even in the absence of 
price competition. Nonetheless, there remains circumstantial evidence that price, 
and the ability to discount, played a non-negligible part in the success of entry.   
• Borders chose to enter the UK but not Germany, and most 
commentators argue that discounting was a key part of their 
business model.   
• The supermarkets, who discount heavily, were among those calling 
for an end to NBA in the UK, and have not entered book retailing to 
anywhere near the same extent in Germany. 
• Low prices are a significant driver of internet retail growth in 
general,4 and Amazon has not achieved as great a market 
penetration in Germany as in the UK (except in the sale of English 
language books where it is allowed to discount).5 
Further insight on both these points can be gained by turning to our 
counterfactuals. Throughout the report, we have argued that the counterfactual 
(what would have happened had NBA not been abolished) might be revealed by 
either (i) the industry's performance prior to abolition, or alternatively, and/or (ii) 
what happened over the post abolition period in Germany – a roughly 
comparable country which retained RPM. We have seen that, compared to the 
pre-abolition UK years, B&M productivity surged ahead impressively immediately 
after 1997, only to fall back below the trend of productivity in the years before 
                                     
4 See http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft921h.pdf, p.39.  
5 Moreover, in France, where Amazon is allowed to discount only up to 5 per cent, it appears to 
take up this option across the board. 
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abolition. Moreover, in Germany, there was no discernible downturn in 
productivity growth post-1997. In that sense, the story appears to have been 
disappointing. However, the comparison with Germany also sheds considerable 
light on our two questions. In Germany, as just discussed, while there was also 
entry by internet sellers (less so supermarkets), their market penetration was 
much less pronounced, and this suggests that it is the low-price aspect of the 
internet sellers which has made them so effective in the UK.6 This would not 
have been possible with RPM retained. Similarly, it seems likely that productivity 
in German B&M has held up better than in the UK precisely because German 
retailers have not faced such a serious downturn in turnover. To the extent that 
this reasoning is correct, one might argue that the sluggish performance of UK 
productivity in the last 10 years is misleading – the full long-term pay-off in 
terms of productivity is yet to emerge. If so, we might expect to observe future 
increases in productivity, partly because of continuing between-firm effects, as 
the supermarkets and internet sellers advance further, and partly because 
remaining B&M retailers eventually achieve the increases in within-firm 
productivity that the Waterstones/Ottakers merger hoped for. 
Book publishing 
The picture is considerably simpler for the publishing sector, if only because it 
was not faced by the same scale of new entry, although, of course, the 
emergence of these firms downstream, with their increasing buyer power, may 
well have increased pressures on all publishers: increased within-firm efficiency 
became more essential given greater pressure on their margins.  
Headline results 
Productivity gains were confined to largely within-firm, perhaps inevitably, given 
the absence of any major entry into the industry.  Within-firm effects were 
observed, both pre- and post-NBA, although the comparisons on this against the 
counterfactuals are mixed. On the one hand, post-NBA abolition productivity 
growth was somewhat slower than pre-abolition. On the other hand, the UK 
                                     
6 This fits with additional general evidence on the role low prices play in online retailing (see 
para's 9.1-9.3).    
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post-1997 compares favourably with Germany over the same period. The 
implication of the latter is that, had the NBA been maintained, productivity may 
even have been stagnant, as opposed to the moderate gains which actually 
occurred. 
Discussion 
We are also able to shed some light on two issues which were commonly 
discussed in the original debate about the pros and cons of NBA. The first was 
that publishers might suffer from abolition because retail price cutting would 
lead to reduced numbers of titles and more demand uncertainty and reluctance 
by retailers to hold large inventories.  If so, one might expect a negative impact 
on within-firm productivity amongst publishers. In fact, our results do not 
suggest that this happened. Second, it was argued that, to the extent that 
publishers were using NBA to facilitate collusion, its abolition would increase the 
intensity of competition between publishers.7 In this case, one might expect 
significant within-firm productivity gains post-abolition. On this, as we have 
already noted, there is scope for some disagreement on the facts, depending 
which counterfactual one uses. On the basis of a comparison of the UK, pre- 
and post-abolition, the evidence suggests no such effect. But, using Germany as 
a counterfactual, there is some evidence in favour of this possibility.  
Assessing the methodology 
Although part of the motivation for this project derives from the intrinsic interest 
of the case per se (RPM continues to be a controversial topic in competition 
economics, and new empirical evidence should be an important input into the 
discussion), a major reason for the project was to suggest a methodology which 
could be applied, in principle, much more generally to any case in which there 
has been a competition intervention. 
                                     
7 The theoretical literature (chapter 3) also suggests that abolition should lead to greater 
upstream competition if (i) there is downstream bargaining power of retailers, who 
nevertheless compete fiercely with each other, or (ii) if RPM helps ease manufacturers 
'commitment' problem (not to discount to retailers).   
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Having proposed such a possible methodology and 'put it through its paces' in a 
particular case, what have we learned about its viability, or otherwise? 
First, recall the main features of the methodology: 
1. To estimate the aggregate productivity of the industry concerned, 
one should build from data on the individual leading firms therein.  So 
this is essentially a micro-based approach, in which the industry is 
derived very much as an aggregation of individual firms. 
2. In principle, productivity might be measured by either labour 
productivity or total factor productivity. The former is the less 
general, but the latter is more dependent on questionable 
assumptions. 
3. We have used AMADEUS as the data source, and while this is not 
necessarily unique it is well-known to be comprehensive and 
internally consistent – both within and across companies.   
4. However, AMADEUS is based on company account data which 
requires deflating, in order that it be converted into real terms.  It is 
essential for the methodology that an appropriate price deflator is 
available.  
5. Conceptually, our approach depends crucially on identifying two 
constituent parts to the growth in aggregate industry productivity: 
between- and within-firm effects. We have proposed a simple 
algebraic decomposition which can be applied to the firm-level data 
for this purpose. This is in the spirit of the OFT's previous recent 
work (2007) on competition and productivity, and is, in our opinion, 
sensible and grounded in a very sound previous academic literature.  
To enact this decomposition, it is essential that we have data on 
individual firms, as described in 1. 
6. Although both within- and between firm effects will reflect, indirectly, 
the consequences of innovation and diffusion, elements of product 
innovation may be neglected.  At the least, this suggests a need for 
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complementary qualitative information on the introduction of new 
products and other aspects of consumer choice. 
 
7. Having estimated the productivity growth of the industry post-
intervention, it is crucial that this should be compared with a 
counterfactual – to compare against what would have happened, had 
the intervention not occurred. Methodologically, the decision of how 
to handle the counterfactual is, or should be, key in any respectable 
empirical economic research. It is the applied equivalent to the ceteris 
paribus clause, much loved (and rightly so!) by economists 
So how do these seven elements of our methodology shape up in practice, and 
what problems have been encountered?    
1. Disaggregated firm-level approach 
 
This case study clearly establishes that this is practicable, at least in two 
industries where there are relatively small numbers of major firms involved 
which focus on the product market concerned. This allows the research 
to avoid the problems of using industry-level data which is often only 
available for too-aggregated classifications: for many purposes, the four 
digit NACE classification is too aggregate. 
 
2. Which measure of productivity? 
 
In this case, we had little option but to choose labour productivity since 
AMADEUS does not report capital stock figures for Germany. In fact, we 
have experimented with deriving TFP by estimating production functions 
for the UK, using panel techniques. However, these suggest sharply 
decreasing returns to scale in the retail sector, which calls into question 
one of the standard assumptions (constant returns) embodied in 
estimating TFP. While these estimates are themselves open to 
interpretational worries, even the possibility of diminishing returns to scale 
would suggest caution in proceeding with TFP. 
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3. AMADEUS 
 
The AMADEUS database proved to be an invaluable source, especially 
when combined with some additional, more specialised, authoritative list 
of leading firms and their market shares (in this case, the recent 
Competition Commission's recent merger enquiry was ideal for our 
purposes). However, inevitably, it is less conclusive, for this type of 
purpose, for those firms that are highly diversified across a wide range of 
products, (in this case the supermarkets), and for multinational firms, 
especially foreign-owned, (in our case Amazon). In both cases, the data 
inevitably offer insufficient product disaggregation.8  
 
4. Price deflators 
 
Accurate price deflators are essential, of course, for any time series 
estimation involving turnover as a proxy for real output. This is especially 
true for an exercise such as this, in which increased competition may 
result in lower prices which, if not corrected for, may give a false 
impression of falling output. In this case, various price deflators are 
available, and we are reasonably convinced that they are based on actual 
(that is, potentially discounted) prices, rather than RRP.  However, we do 
have lingering doubts as to whether they accurately reflect the growing 
retail practice of offering 'three for the price of two'.  
 
5. The between-firm within-firm decomposition 
 
The algebraic decomposition was successful in isolating the very different 
between- and within-firm effects in retail. This forms an important aid to 
unravelling the aggregate picture. However, it suffered from the absence 
of hard data on the key supermarket and internet players (see 3 above.) 
 
 
                                     
8  It should be stressed that these are not criticisms of AMADEUS per se, but rather the reported 
company accounts data on which it draws. 
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6. Innovation 
 
While we are satisfied that the between- and within-firm effects indirectly 
capture many of the consequences of innovation and diffusion, a major 
omission is product innovation. In the light of the knowledge acquired in 
carrying out the present case study, we see no 'easy fix' for resolving 
this. In order to acquire a reasonable understanding of the importance of 
product innovation and (even more so) to measure its importance will 
often require detailed survey work (or an already existing survey). 
  
7. The counterfactual 
 
We have employed two alternative counterfactuals. The 'before and after' 
alternative was limited by the relative paucity of firm-specific data pre-
1997, and the obvious fact that so much had changed over a relatively 
long period, not all of which could be attributed to NBA. In our opinion, 
the use of Germany as comparator was more fruitful, not least for the 
insights it provides on the different impacts of supermarket and internet 
sellers in the two countries. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The HM Treasury report, Productivity in the UK 7: Securing long term 
productivity,9 states that 'Productivity growth is the key determinant of 
long-run growth, and together with employment growth leads to higher 
prosperity.' At the macro level productivity increases allow higher output 
for a given level of inputs and thus facilitates inflation free economic 
growth and higher standards of living (OFT (2007)). Along with 
innovation, investment, skills and enterprise, competition is regarded as 
one of the five drivers of productivity in the UK economy (Treasury 
(2000)).  
1.2 The focus of this report is the link between competition and productivity. 
At a micro level, there is considerable empirical evidence of this strong 
link between competition and productivity. Studies demonstrate that 
greater competition enhances productivity and examine the different 
mechanisms through which this effect arises (see paragraph's 4.2-4.4 
and OFT (2007)). However, as the OFT (2007) survey demonstrates 
there is far less evidence on the effect competition policy can have on 
increasing productivity. This report aims to provide additional evidence 
of the effects of government intervention on productivity by studying the 
impact of the abolition of the Net Book Agreement (NBA) in the UK in 
the mid 1990s.  
1.3 From approximately 1900, publishers used the NBA to restrict the retail 
price of books in the UK. By the mid 1990s this practise had started to 
break down in part due to significant changes occurring in the industry 
and in 1997 it was formally ended by the Restrictive Practises Court. 
Thus by the mid-1990s a new era in which booksellers were free to 
choose their prices had begun.  
1.4 The abolition of the Net Book Agreement (NBA) provides an ideal case to 
study the impact increased competition can have on productivity. Firstly, 
the intervention occurred around 10 years ago and thus a significant 
                                     
9 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/C/C/productivity_uk7.pdf  
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period of time has passed for long-run changes to the industry to occur. 
Secondly, as paragraph's 2.4-2.6 discusses, several other European 
countries continue to maintain fixed book price systems. These two 
factors are important because as the OFT (2007) report explains it is 
generally a difficult task to analyse the impact on productivity of a 
competition policy intervention. Because of the long-term nature of 
productivity changes it can be difficult to isolate the separate influences 
of a policy intervention. It is particularly difficult to take account of the 
counter-factual that is, what would have happened absent intervention. 
In this case international comparisons will be useful in establishing the 
counter-factual. Finally, the book industry is an industry for which a 
reasonable amount of information and data is publicly available. 
1.5 Therefore, the evidence unearthed provides a rich medium-run picture on 
the effects of a particular vertical restraint and its abolition. As discussed 
earlier the academic empirical literature is strangely lacking on such 
examples and moreover, recent revisions in thinking on the 'pros' and 
'cons' of RPM, especially in the US, make this study particularly timely.10  
1.6 The focus of the report will be on a market definition broadly defined as 
books11 (both fiction and non-fiction) sold in national markets. Some 
distinction will also be made later between best-sellers and deep-range 
titles. We will analyse both the publishers and the retailers' side of the 
market.   
1.7 The second important motivation for this report is to design and critically 
evaluate a general methodology which might be used for analysing 
productivity in any market following an intervention. This is to contribute 
to the development of the OFT's approach to evaluation. The OFT 
currently evaluates the effects of its interventions on consumers taking 
into account how the intervention may have reduced prices or deterred 
                                     
10 See for example http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/070122Leegin06-480amicusPDC.pdf.  
11 In theory the fact that school book titles were exempt from the NBA should be taken into 
account, however data is typically not available at this disaggregated level.  
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anti-competitive behaviour in other markets. This report evaluates the 
effects of an intervention on productivity which can create gains to 
consumers when efficiency savings are passed on, and also to the 
economy as a whole. Paragraph's 5.2-5.9 therefore provides a simple 
methodology which can be used in this manner.             
1.8 The remainder of the report is structured as follows: chapter 2 provides 
a brief history of the NBA and the UK book market, and gives an 
overview of the book markets in other countries. The economic literature 
on the effects of agreements such as the NBA, and more general forms 
of retail price maintenance, is surveyed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 very 
briefly summarizes the academic literature on the relationship between 
productivity and competition, and then discusses potential productivity 
gains from abolishing the NBA. Chapter 5 describes the methodology to 
be used. Chapter 6 gives a brief description of the recent trends in the 
UK book industry. Chapter 7 describes the data, and the productivity 
analysis is conducted in chapter 8. Chapter 9 describes the international 
comparators before making the productivity comparisons with the UK. 
Chapter 10 briefly discusses innovation, product quality and choice and 
the extent to which our methodology captures these factors.   
 
 
  
  
OFT981 20 
 
 
2 RPM ON BOOKS 
History of UK net book agreement  
2.1 From its beginnings in approximately 1900 until its ending in 1995–
1997, the Net Book Agreement (NBA) had a profound effect on the 
publishing and retailing of books.12 The NBA artificially constrained the 
retail prices of books by preventing retailers from selling a book under 
the publisher's chosen (net) price. Any retailer that deviated from the 
agreement would be refused the supply of future books by all publishers. 
This collective nature of the enforcement of the NBA constituted an 
unusual example of 'collective resale price maintenance'.  
2.2 In 1956 the government began a new pro-active era on vertical 
restraints between firms with the introduction of the 1956 Restrictive 
Practices Act. This prohibited any collective enforcement of restrictive 
practices and the later 1964 Resale Prices Act went even further by 
forbidding any individually enforced resale price maintenance. The NBA 
would seem to be in breach of both Acts. In an attempt to seek an 
exemption, the NBA was rewritten and formalised in 1957. An 
exemption was granted in Restrictive Practices Court in 1962, where Mr 
Justice Buckley famously emphasised that 'books are different', viewing 
the NBA to be in the interests of society.  
2.3 The NBA remained until the mid-nineties, when its enforcement was 
becoming difficult due to the rapidly changing nature of the retail sector. 
First, the growth of book retailing by supermarkets introduced new 
retailers with huge bargaining powers that threatened to break the 
agreement. Second, the emergence of discount retailing by book club 
retailers made enforcement significantly harder. Further pressure came 
from the European Commission in 1988, when it judged the NBA to be 
in breach of Article 85 because of the cross border considerations 
between the UK and EIRE. This resulted in the NBA's collapse in EIRE in 
                                     
12 See for example Dobson (1996) and Davies et al (2004) Ch 4 for more detailed discussion of 
the NBA and its abolition.  
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1992. In September 1995, the Publishers' Association finally disbanded 
the agreement, making it effectively inoperable for publishers. In March 
1997 the Restrictive Practices Court formally outlawed the NBA, under 
the 1976 Restrictive Practices Act. Book retailers were now free to set 
prices below the levels recommended by publishers, without the threat 
of future punishment. 
Book pricing systems in other countries  
2.4 Stockmann's recent survey (2004) of patterns of book pricing in Europe 
distinguishes two alternative forms of fixed price system: those enforced 
by trade agreements and those enforced by law.13 While Denmark 
remains one of the few countries to retain a trade agreement,14 the 
major trend appears to be a movement towards either to free pricing or 
legal fixed pricing agreements. For example, Sweden adopted free prices 
as early as 1970, and the US has never had any price maintenance due 
to the Sherman Act and is still considered to have a healthy book market 
(Allan and Curwen 1991, p.63).15 Alternatively, France established its 
'Loi Lang' legal price fixing agreement in 198116 and German RPM dates 
                                     
13 Trade agreements often cover more than just fixed prices (Stockmann (2004) pg 50) and can 
provide the publishers with the right to fix prices rather than the obligation to do so (see 
footnote 14). In contrast, legally enforced fixed price agreements typically require a fixed price 
to be imposed (see footnote 25).  
14 Before 2001 retailers other than bookshops were not allowed to sell most types of books 
(Stockmann (2004) pg 55) and publishers have had the right to fix prices rather than being 
obliged to do so. In 2006 further rules were put in place restricting the fixed prices to 10 per 
cent of new publications and also restricting the length of time duration for which prices can 
be fixed see:http://www.ks.dk/english/competition/national-decisions/national-decisions 
2006/publishers-right-to-fix-book-prices-considerably-reduced/ 
15 Allan W and Curwen P (1991),  
16 In France retailers are allowed to price up to a maximum of 5 per cent below the price set by 
publishers Beck (2003). 
  
  
OFT981 22 
 
 
back to 1878, where it is claimed to provide an efficient supply and 
healthy stock of literary and academic books.17 
2.5 Even between the countries which have adopted price fixing agreements 
there is considerable heterogeneity. Differences include: the range of 
books covered, how long the fixed price must be maintained, the trade 
terms negotiated with suppliers (previously these were often negotiated 
by trade associations), whether authors royalties are based on the fixed 
price and other literature, and cultural policies including VAT.18 Likewise, 
for free price systems there are differences (and often some fixed 
elements), for example in Sweden Recommended Retail Prices (RRPs) 
printed on books are prohibited whilst they are common in the UK. 
2.6 In the late 1990s the European Commission became concerned that 
fixed book price systems were contravening competition laws.19 An 
investigation into the Dutch fixed price system ended only when the 
fixed prices were removed from imported books. A similar more lengthy 
set of proceedings continued into the year 2000 against the German, 
Austrian (and Swiss): 'Sammelrevers' fixed price system, a cross-border 
fixed price system covering publishers and retailers in both countries. 
Eventually an agreement was reached to restrict the systems to national 
markets.20 However, in 2001 proceedings were reopened as evidence 
                                     
17 Publishers Association (2006), pg 22.  
18 See also Canoy et al (2005) for a summary of the various public policies which can be used in 
book markets.   
19 See also Beck (2003), pg's 8-9 for a discussion of two earlier cases from the 1980s 
concerning book markets in the Flemish regions and France.  
20 See: European Commission Press Release (IP/00/183), Reaction by Commissioner Mario Monti 
to the Agreement on the Fixed Book Price (Germany and Austria), February (2000) 183 and 
(IP/00/651), New German System of Fixed Book Prices Does Not Violate EU Competition Rules 
as Long as Certain Conditions are Respected, June 2000. In addition recently Switzerland has 
moved to remove fixed prices on Germany books leading to fears about the impact this will 
have on the German market, see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/arts/24book.html?pagewanted=all 
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suggests the 'new Sammelrevers' continued to affect trade between 
member states. This renewed concern was initiated by complaints 
received by the Commission, from two internet book sellers: an Austrian 
firm attempting to sell German books exported to Austria back to 
German consumers and a firm wanting to sell German books worldwide 
from Belgium. Both internet retailers were attempting to set prices 
substantially below the fixed prices in Germany and were therefore 
refused supply by German wholesalers and publishers. The Commission 
not only found this to affect trade but also deemed the refusal to supply 
to be collusive behaviour.21 In 2002 undertakings22 were accepted 
guaranteeing the freedom of cross border trade in books (especially via 
the Internet) and outlawing collective refusal to supply as an 
enforcement mechanism. A set of conditions also outlined what could be 
regarded as a circumvention of a book pricing system.23 Throughout the 
European Commission involvement, it is clear that the principle of 
subsidiarity has been very much upheld that is, member states can 
decide the form of pricing system they wish to adopt. This is at least in 
part driven by the cultural aspects of the product.24 However, in line 
with Article 81(1) of the EU treaty (Article 85 in the earlier pressure on 
the NBA in the UK and EIRE) the Commission has sought to protect 
trade between member states. Interestingly, in 2002 the German fixed 
                                     
21 See: European Commission Press Release (IP/01/1035), Commission Re-opens Proceedings 
Concerning the German System of Fixed Book Prices Because of its Effects on Cross-border 
Internet Bookselling, July 2001.  
22 See European Commission Press Release (IP/02/461), Commission Accepts Undertaking in 
Competition Proceedings Regarding German Book Price Fixing, March 2002.  
23 As a consequence of this case the 'Rothley report' was drawn up by the European Parliament 
and Council setting up a directive on fixed book prices and outlining the conditions for 
circumvention of a fixed price agreement see Stockmann (2004).    
24 In addition the Rothley report suggest fixed price systems can aid independent publishers, 
literary production, research and teaching, freedom of opinion and the European idea, and a 
network of bookshops (see Stockmann (2004) pg's 54-55).  
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price system became enforced in law25 and evidence suggests the 
system is strongly enforced, for example in 2004, in a case brought by a 
bookstore owner, a German court ruling prevented a journalist from 
selling new review copies of books on the e-bay auction site at a price 
below the fixed price.26     
 
                                     
25 Previously publishers could impose fixed prices but were not obliged to, Beck (2003) pg 43 
shows that for a sample of books from 2000-2001 8 per cent of titles did not have a fixed 
price imposed.  
26 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4105  
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3 THE EFFECTS OF RPM ON COMPETITION AND WELFARE 
3.1 One can define Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) as any attempt by an 
upstream producer(s) to control the prices set by downstream retailers. 
In principle, RPM can allow manufacturers to dictate the exact retail 
price or to impose a maximum retail price, as well as enabling the 
manufacturers to set a minimum retail price, as was the case in the Net 
Book Agreement. In what follows, we show that theoretically RPM can 
have either anti-competitive or beneficial effects and give a brief review 
of the empirical evidence. For some more general reviews of RPM refer 
to Matthewson and Winter (1998), Church and Ware (2000), Motta 
(2004) or Weisspfennig (2007). 
The anti-competitive effects of RPM 
RPM can increase prices by facilitating collusion 
3.2 One key issue in the Net Book Agreement was the possibility of collusion 
among the publishers (manufacturers). Under normal circumstances, the 
inability of manufacturers to monitor rival wholesale prices, may make 
collusion difficult because any manufacturer could deviate from the 
collusive prices without detection or punishment. However, several 
papers have demonstrated that RPM can help to facilitate collusion and 
dampen competition between manufacturers. 
3.3 Telser (1960) first suggested that RPM can help manufacturers collude, 
arguing that the introduction of fixed retail prices would remove the 
incentive for manufacturers to cut their wholesale prices. Any wholesale 
price reduction would not increase product demand and would only 
serve to increase retailer profits. Jullien and Rey (2000) provide a more 
rigorous analysis in this setting. Without RPM, retailers can use their 
private information about local demand shocks to set optimal, but noisy, 
retail prices. With RPM, the manufacturer is forced to set stable retail 
prices that are insensitive to demand conditions. This generates a static 
loss in profits, but may also aid manufacturer collusion because any 
deviation in wholesale prices can now be detected more easily from 
observing the subsequent change in the otherwise stable retail prices.   
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3.4 A related argument suggests that RPM may result from retailer, rather 
than manufacturer, collusion. Yamey (1954) suggested that retailers 
might benefit from forcing a manufacturer to set RPM in order to assist 
the coordination and enforcement of retailer collusion and to deter low-
priced entrants. However it is unclear what the incentives are for the 
manufacturer to commit to, and enforce, such a practice. 
RPM can increase prices by dampening competition 
3.5 Dobson and Waterson (2007) argue that RPM can reduce the incentives 
for manufacturers to compete even within a static framework. They 
analyse the competition effects of industry-wide RPM in a model where 
two manufacturers each sell a differentiated product through two 
differentiated retailers and unilaterally negotiate over (linear) wholesale 
prices. RPM is capable of two opposing effects on prices. In some 
scenarios RPM can reduce prices. When retailers have weak bargaining 
power but strong market power, free trade would allow retailers to set 
high mark-ups on already high wholesale prices. RPM therefore helps 
reduce inefficiently high prices. In other scenarios RPM is likely to 
increase prices. When retailer bargaining power is high and when there is 
tough competition between retailers, free competition would allow 
retailers to fight hard for reductions in wholesale prices that would then 
be forced into lower retail prices through competition. RPM prevents this 
and so creates higher retail prices. Rey and Verge (2004) show that 
these anti-competitive effects of RPM can be even more extreme and 
capable of eliminating all competition if manufacturers use two-part 
tariffs, rather than linear wholesale prices. 
RPM can increase prices by resolving the commitment problem 
3.6 RPM may also allow a manufacturer to make the best use of its market 
power when negotiating with its retailers downstream, or in more 
technical terms, RPM can help the manufacturer ease its commitment 
problem, (Hart and Tirole 1990, and O'Brien and Shaffer 1992). 
Consider a manufacturer who has just offered two retailers the same 
contract. The manufacturer may now face a profitable incentive to 
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renegotiate with one of the retailers - offering that retailer a lower 
wholesale cost, in order to provide it with an advantage over its rival. 
Anticipating this possibility, both retailers will be unwilling to agree to 
expensive contracts and the market power of the manufacturer will be 
restricted by its incentives to renegotiate. The introduction of credible, 
industry-wide RPM will remove this commitment problem however, as 
retailer's profits will be made immune to the incentive of rivals to cut 
price following a renegotiation. RPM can act to sustain manufacturer 
profits and retail prices, reducing consumer surplus. 
The efficiency effects of RPM 
RPM can increase the provision of retail services 
3.7 RPM may offer potential benefits to society. A long line of literature has 
emphasised the possibility that the restriction of retailer price 
competition through RPM may encourage the provision of services that 
consumers find valuable, such as advice from salespeople, or browsing 
through the retailer's wide range of stock. RPM may help both producers 
and consumers by increasing the ability and willingness of retailers to 
provide demand-enhancing, but non-contractible services.  
3.8 Telser's (1960) original argument suggested that retailers may be 
unwilling to provide such services under free competition due to a 
potential free riding problem. For example, if a consumer could browse 
the stock of one book retailer before then buying the book more cheaply 
elsewhere, the incentive to provide the stock would be clearly reduced 
or eliminated. RPM can restore the incentive to provide such services. 
3.9 While this 'special services' story may appear limited, much research has 
since extended its applicability. Marvel and McCafferty (1984) interpret 
the service as simply the act of a retailer choosing to stock the product. 
If consumers identify some retailers as having the costly skill of in 
ascertaining product quality, then the mere stocking of a product by 
these retailers may constitute a demand-enhancing service. RPM can 
maintain higher retail prices in a way that induces such higher cost 
retailers to stock the product, enhancing demand and potentially, 
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welfare. Note however, that not everyone may favour the use of RPM. 
Discount stores may be prevented from competing in the way they 
would like, and informed consumers, who have no need for such signals, 
may also prefer free competition.   
3.10 Winter (1993) generalises the service argument further by showing that 
it can exist even when services have no free-rider or spillover effects. 
Consider a differentiated retail duopoly where each retailer can provide 
some service that makes the purchase of the product less costly, such 
as increasing the number of sales assistants, providing large 
stockholdings or a larger car park. Consumers differ in their location 
between the two retailers and in their cost of time. Under free 
competition, the retailers will focus on competing for the 'marginal' 
consumers that are indifferent between which store to visit. Such 
consumers will not be located in the close proximity of either store, and 
will be over- represented by consumers with costs of time low enough to 
make a visit to either firm optimal. Consequently, firms' prices and 
service levels will be determined by consumers with lower than average 
costs of time, implying that equilibrium prices and service levels will be 
lower than the social optimal. RPM can restore this balance and offer the 
incentive to provide higher service levels. However, RPM may actually 
make consumers worse off by generating prices and services that are 
too high, as manufacturers with large levels of market power may prefer 
levels of service that are actually above the social optimum. 
3.11 A key issue in the NBA debate was its effect on the provision of stock 
holdings by retailers, and more generally, its effect on the existence of 
independent, specialist sellers. In a related, but separate line of the 
theoretical service argument, RPM has been shown to offer potential 
welfare improvements by restricting the ability for price-cutters to 
damage the incentives for retailers to hold more stock. Deneckere et al's 
(1996) simple example provides one illustration of this logic. A single 
manufacturer sells to a competitive retail sector in a market with 
uncertain demand. Retailers who choose high stockholdings will be able 
to sell out when demand is high but face the possibility of unsold stock 
when demand is low. Any unsold stock is assumed to be of low value to 
firms, and so this story may not be consistent with the prevalent use of 
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'sale or return' policies that allow retailers to return unsold stock.27 
Under free competition, a retailer can cut its price to increase the 
probability that it sells its stock, while reducing the probability that rival 
retailers sell theirs. This possibility makes retailers less willing to carry 
high levels of stock and so RPM may induce retailers to hold higher 
inventories in a way that generates higher manufacturer profits. In a 
more general setting, Deneckere et al show that RPM guarantees an 
increase in profits, but creates an ambiguous effect on consumer surplus 
and total welfare as the increase in availability must be traded off 
against increased prices. These results are robust to the introduction of 
competition at the manufacturer level (Wang 2004) and when prices are 
determined by market clearing, after the realisation of demand 
(Deneckere et al 1997). 
RPM can limit retail prices 
3.12 When both manufacturers and retailers have significant market power, 
free competition can result in inefficiently high prices as both 
manufacturer and retailer want to increase their price above cost. As 
discussed above in reference to Dobson and Waterson (2007), RPM can 
limit this by providing a price ceiling to retailers. However, as we are 
interested in the effects of the NBA providing a price floor, we do not 
focus on this effect here. For more on these 'double marginalisation' 
effects, see the general references listed above. 
The empirical evidence of the effects of RPM 
3.13 There is little empirical evidence capable of discriminating between these 
various explanations of RPM. 
 
                                     
27 Interestingly Beck (2003) pg. 6 provides evidence that books returned by retailers are 
reasonably uncommon under RPM and much more common when free pricing systems are 
used. The 1997 NBA hearing stressed the importance of 'sale or return' practices in the UK 
market. 
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3.14 Ippolito (1991) analyses the details of a set of RPM legal cases from 
1976-1982 and finds that most uses of RPM appeared consistent with 
the special service argument. Thirty per cent contained maximum, rather 
than minimum prices and less than 15 per cent were consistent with an 
explanation of collusion. 
3.15 Two papers use an events study methodology to consider how factors 
affecting the use of RPM affect the perceived profits of the firms 
involved, by analysing changes in the firms' share prices. While such 
studies can be criticised for assuming that share prices are able to 
correctly reflect any changes in underlying factors, their results can still 
be illuminating. Gilligan (1986) analyses the change in manufacturers' 
share prices following the announcement of an antitrust challenge to 
their use of RPM. He notes that manufacturers' shares often fall, but it is 
not clear if the changes in share prices reflect changes in projected 
profits, or the associated antitrust fines. It is also unclear whether 
results are biased because the sample only includes industries that 
encountered legal action. Hersch (1994) avoids some of these problems 
by analysing the stock returns of manufacturers and retailers following 
the Schwegmann decision in 1951 that weakened the legal 
enforceability of RPM in the US. Hersch found that many manufacturer 
profits remained unchanged but some, including those for consumer 
electronics, increased, as consistent with an explanation of retailer 
collusion. Retailer profits were also largely unchanged but increased for 
department stores. By relating the changes to industry characteristics 
some, perhaps tenuous, conclusions support the explanations of retailer 
collusion and special services.  
3.16 Beck (2006) considers the German book market's propensity to set retail 
prices that are clustered together at several 'focal' prices. Beck rejects 
the possibility that such prices are a result of collusion with the aid of 
RPM, as such books tend to be priced at levels below those predicted 
from the books' observable characteristics. Instead, he suggests both 
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focal pricing and RPM may be used in response to demand uncertainty, 
especially on titles of new authors.28   
3.17 Biscourp et al (2007) analyse some of the potential effects of RPM by 
studying the consequences of the 1997 Galland Act on French food 
prices. The Galland Act prohibits retailers from pricing products below 
their invoice costs but still allows manufacturers to provide their retailers 
with 'off-invoice' discounts or rebates at the end of year. Manufacturers 
are then able to eliminate price competition between retailers by creating 
a retail price floor though increased invoice costs, while offsetting the 
effects on retailers with rebates. The authors provide evidence in line 
with this possibility by showing that since 1997, overall food prices 
have increased faster than inflation, price increases have been largest in 
areas where prices were lower to begin with and, in contrast to pre-
1997, prices have become unrelated to levels of local competition.  
                                     
28 See also for example Canoy et al (2005) and Hjorth-Andersen (2000) on book pricing issues 
including demand uncertainty and cross-subsidisation.  
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4 PRODUCTIVITY 
4.1 In this section, we briefly summarise the OFT's recent (2007) report on 
productivity and competition, and then we discuss some specific 
predictions of how the abolition of the NBA may have affected 
productivity through changes in the level of competition.  
Productivity and competition  
4.2 The OFT (2007) report argues that competition is likely to enhance 
productivity because of positive effects on efficiency and innovation. It 
outlines the two main types of productivity measures:  
• Labour productivity – the value of output per worker (per hour)    
• Total factor productivity – the difference between changes in the 
value of output and the weighted changes in labour and capital 
inputs   
4.3 There is strong general evidence to show that competition enhances 
productivity for example, Nickell (1996) and for deregulation, for 
example, Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2005). In addition, more micro analysis 
involves focusing on the specific mechanisms through which competition 
can impact on productivity. The OFT (2007) study identifies three key 
mechanisms:  
• Within firm effects – competition, or the threat of entry, puts 
pressure on firms to use their resources more efficiently and thereby 
reduce x-inefficiency and/or introduce product innovation.    
• Between firm effects / market sorting – competition can reallocate 
market share, with higher productivity firms gaining market share at 
the expense of less productive firms, and/or new entrants replacing 
existing low productivity firms.  
• Innovation – competition can potentially increase the incentives for 
product and process innovation. Dynamic efficiency gains can be 
gained through new and better production methods. Social value can 
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be created through the development of new products or retail 
formats.  
4.4 Empirical studies provide considerable evidence of both within firm 
effects (for example, Bloom & Van Reenen (2006)) and between firm 
effects (for example, Geroski (1995)). In contrast the relationship 
between competition and innovation depends upon: the definition of 
competition (for or in the market), the model of competition (see OFT 
(2007)) and the conflict between pre and post innovation rents (low post 
innovation rents discourage innovation (Schumpeter (1942), whilst low 
pre innovation rents encourage innovation (Arrow (1962)). The OFT 
study therefore concludes that 'there is no universally acceptable rule for 
maximizing the innovation in a market. Markets will tend to develop their 
own modes of competition/innovation.'29    
Abolition of NBA: expectations on competition and productivity 
4.5 The abolition of the NBA might be expected to have impacted on 
productivity through its effects on competition in a variety of ways. 
Referring back to chapter 3, and the views of the Court in both the 1962 
and 1997 hearings, we now discuss how the removal of the NBA was 
predicted to affect competition, and how such changes would be 
predicted to effect productivity. 
Retail price competition 
4.6 The removal of the NBA was expected to reduce book prices by 
increasing price competition and facilitating the entry of low-price 
entrants such as supermarkets and internet sellers. Originally in 1962, 
the Court disagreed by predicting that the increased demand uncertainty 
from free pricing would reduce retailers' orders and increase publishers' 
costs through a loss in economies of scale. However, this was quickly 
dismissed in the 1997 hearing as book production now involved better 
technology and the introduction of 'sale or return' policies and quicker 
                                     
29 OFT (2007), p.36.  
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delivery times would lessen the impact on stock orders. Consequently, 
price competition was expected to increase and prices were expected to 
fall. This may also be expected to prompt the exit of small independent, 
and potentially less efficient retailers, while transferring market share to 
the potentially more productive and lower cost large retailers. One would 
expect the increase in price competition to therefore increase within-
retailer productivity, increase between-retailer productivity. The likely 
effects on retailer innovation are perhaps ambiguous. On the one hand it 
may be enhanced by easier entry for potentially innovative new firms. 
On the other hand, it may curtail service levels and perhaps innovation 
by smaller independents.   
Retail non-price competition  
4.7 The increase in price competition was expected to influence non-price 
competition.  In line with the research summarised in chapter 3, the 
removal of RPM may reduce service provision in a way that could be 
beneficial or damaging to society. As explained above, however, the 
possible reduction in the provision of stockholdings was thought to be 
minimal due to changes in industry practices. Further, in response to 
tougher price competition, some retailers (especially smaller retailers) 
may specialise in offering specialist services such as back-list orders. It 
was therefore unclear how the removal of the NBA would have affected 
service provisions. 
Publisher competition 
4.8 As explained in chapter 3, the NBA may have acted to dampen 
competition between publishers and help facilitate collusion. If so its 
abolition would be predicted to increase competition between publishers. 
Further, in line with the arguments of Dobson and Waterson (2007), the 
increased competition between larger retailers with high bargaining 
power may be thought to induce tougher competition between 
publishers. These changes would be expected to increase within-
publisher productivity, increase between-publisher productivity. Again 
the effects on innovation (is this case publishers) are ambiguous. With 
the removal of the protection of collusion innovation might be an 
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essential part of the ensuring new competition; but reduced publisher 
profits might impair publishers' ability to fund innovation.   
Author competition  
4.9 Another possible effect of the NBA abolition was on the production of 
books by authors. In 1997 the Court viewed this effect to be minor. The 
returns from book writing may fall from increased retail competition, but 
this may or may not reduce the number of titles written and produced.  
4.10 In summary, the abolition of the NBA can be predicted to increase (both 
within-firm and between-firm) productivity for retailers and publishers, 
while creating ambiguous effects on publisher and retailer innovation. 
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5 A SIMPLE METHODOLOGY 
5.1 This section introduces a simple methodology. It is intended to have 
general applicability, and so is not peculiar to the circumstances of this 
particular case. In essence, there are two aims to the methodology: 
• to devise a simple method for distinguishing and quantifying within-
firm and between-firm changes in productivity over a time period by 
separating productivity growth within firms from the additional 
benefit of higher productivity firms increasing their market share 
(between firm gains), and  
• to apply it to the performance of an industry following a policy 
intervention in order to compare against a counterfactual - what 
would have happened, absent the intervention.   
A method for distinguishing within and between-firm effects on 
productivity (see Appendix 1 for a simple illustrative example) 
5.2 The following methodology has been designed to be: 
• not too demanding in its data requirements 
• not over sensitive to questionable economic assumptions 
• open to easy interpretation 
• replicable for other markets (i.e. not books-sensitive or even 
dependent on having a product which is relatively easily measurable. 
5.3 First, let tP  be some (unspecified) measure of aggregate industry 
productivity at time t .  This can be written, quite generally, as the 
weighted average of the productivities of all N  firms in the industry: 
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where itP  is the productivity and wit is the share-related weight of firm i  
at time t . In the case of labour productivity, the weight comes out 
naturally from the decomposition as the firm's share of industry 
employment. 
 
5.4 It follows that the change in productivity between times t  and 1+t  can 
be written as: 
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5.5 Thus the change in industry productivity can be decomposed into two 
parts:   
• A: the (weighted) average increase in individual firm productivity 
• B: a composition effect, the sign and magnitude of which will 
depend on whether there is a tendency for higher productivity firms 
to increase their share of the industry. 
5.6 To see this, consider two extreme cases. In case 1, assume all firms 
increase their productivity between t  and 1+t  by an amountλ , without 
any changes in their industry shares.  In that case, there is only a within-
firm effect, as  
λ=−+ )( 1 itit PP and 0)( 1 =−+ itit ww for all i , and thus A=λ and B = 0   (3) 
 
 
  
  
OFT981 38 
 
 
5.7 In case 2, suppose productivity is constant in all firms between t  
and 1+t , but that higher productivity firms grow more rapidly than low 
productivity firms.  In that case, there is no within-firm effect, as  
0)( 1 =−+ tt PP  for all i and A=0,      (4) 
but, given a (presumably) positive correlation between growth in share 
)( 1
i
t
i
t ww −+  and productivity level itP , then it is easy to show that B>0.  
As an illustration, suppose that there is a positive linear relationship 
between growth of share and productivity: 
 
i
t
i
t
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t Pww βα +=−+ )( 1      (5) 
 
5.8 It is then easily shown that:30  
B = )var(PNβ       (6) 
 
where )var(P  is the variance of productivity across firms at time t .  The 
net impact on industry productivity will be greater (i) the larger is β  (the 
more that high productivity benefits the firm’s growth) and (ii) the larger 
the dispersion of productivity within the industry (the more scope there 
is for high productivity firms to grow at the expense of low productivity 
firms). 
 
                                     
30 (6) follows by inserting (5) into the expression for B in (2) and noting that Pβα −=  (which 
follows from summing (5) across all firms, noting that the sum of changing weights is zero), 
and re-expressing using ( )∑ −= n
i
i PNPP 22 /)var( .  
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Allowing for entry and exit 
5.9 The algebra above assumes a constant population of firms over time, but 
more generally, we would want to allow for exit of (hopefully 
unproductive) and entry of (hopefully more productive) firms. This is 
easily captured by adding a third term, (C), to capture the net effect of 
entry: 
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where N  is now the number of firms that are active in both periods, E  
is the number of entrants in period 1+t , X  is the number of firms that 
exit in period 1+t and itw  is now the share-related weight of firm i  
across all firms that are active in period t . Thus entry/exit will enhance 
industry productivity if entrants have higher productivity than exitors, 
especially if they are larger in size in aggregate.31  
 
Practicalities 
Identifying a counterfactual 
5.10 In this case, there are two fairly obvious ways of approximating the 
counterfactual: 
• how the industry performed before the intervention 
• how the same industry performed in other countries in which RPM 
prevailed, but which were otherwise comparable (as section 9.1 
explains Germany was chosen as a useful comparator country).   
                                     
31 For strict comparability with survivors, we could decompose (C), in turn, into one component 
representing the difference in productivity of entrants and exitors and another term 
representing the difference in their shares between t and t+1. 
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5.11 Comparing between countries is particularly useful as this should also 
control for exogenous factors, such as technological advances that can 
be expected to have a similar effect across different countries.  
Which measure of productivity? 
5.12 As mentioned, in principle, this methodology might be applied for any 
measure of productivity. In practice, the two most likely candidates are 
labour or total factor productivity. To anticipate, data constraints in this 
case will largely rule out TFP. Most importantly, our main data source 
(AMADEUS) does not report the necessary information on capital inputs 
for many German firms. Equally important, some exploratory 
econometric estimation of production functions for book retailing and 
publishing in the UK are strongly suggestive of decreasing returns to 
scale (see Appendix 7).   
5.13 While these experiments are only exploratory, even the possibility of 
decreasing returns makes us hesitant to employ normal practice of using 
the labour share in value added as an indicator of exponent on labour in 
computing TFP.3233  
How far to go with sampling 
5.14 In principle, this methodology assumes data are available for both 
productivity and market share for all firms in the industry. In practice, 
this is unlikely, and incomplete sampling is inevitable, especially for 
smaller firms. In many cases (and certainly in this) it may only be 
possible to assemble data for a sample of smaller firms. In that case, it 
will be important to have definitive information on the population size 
                                     
32 These doubts are compounded by the possibility that neither the factor nor the product 
markets are perfectly competitive in this sector.  While decreasing returns and imperfect 
competition can be accommodated in computing TFP, under certain circumstances, this would 
involve having access to a far richer database then we have for the current project.  
33 See Annexe B to OFT (2007) for a discussion of the issues involved in computing TFP. 
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distribution, in order to gross up from the sample small firms to the 
population small firms.  
Innovation 
5.15 This methodology does not explicitly incorporate an innovation 
dimension. However, especially for process innovation, this will be 
captured by the within-firm growth in productivity. Moreover, innovation 
is often in the form of new business models. Insofar as entrants enter 
with a new business model (involving higher productivity), then this will 
also be captured by the above. Nevertheless, there will be some 
dimensions of innovation, notably product innovation, not captured by 
the methodology. On this there are limits to what we can achieve in a 
relatively small scale project such as this, although we will draw on any 
qualitative information that becomes available (see chapter 10). 
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6 THE UK BOOK INDUSTRY 
6.1 This section gives a brief overview of trends in the UK book market.  
6.2 In 2005 over 300 million books were sold in the UK. Consumer 
expenditure on books grew from £2.3b in 1996 to £3.2b in 2006 (in 
2003 prices), which represents an increase in share of total retail 
spending from 1 to 1.3 per cent.34  Figure 6.1 shows the growth in the 
volume of books35 sold in the UK from 1995-2006. This remained fairly 
constant around the time the NBA was abolished in the mid 1990s, but 
since then there has been a significant increase although the rate of 
increase has slowed in very recent years.  
Figure 6.1: The volume of books sold in the UK from 1995–200636 
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34 Verdict (2007), pg 4 Table 1.  
35 This includes all consumer expenditure on books including atlases, dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
textbooks, guidebooks, musical scores and maps.  
36 Derived from Verdict (2007) Table 1, pg 4.  
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6.3 The number of new book titles published in the UK has also increased 
especially in recent years (Figure 6.2).37  
Figure 6.2: Book titles (new and revised) published in the UK 1990–
200538 
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Retail sector  
6.4 As Table 6.1 shows in the years after abolition of the NBA, the main 
structural changes were a significant decline in the independent retailers' 
share, but growth in the shares of large and multiple stores, book clubs 
and supermarkets. The internet also emerged as an important alternative 
outlet for the purchase of books.  
                                     
37 This includes all titles published including school textbooks which were exempt from the NBA. 
However, between 1998 and 2002 the number of new and revised fiction titles grew by 28 
per cent compared to 8 per cent for school textbooks, figures derived from: 
http://www.publishers.org.uk/en/document/index.cfm/docid/2C27200B-41DA-4133-
8242D34D96B8346E  
38 http://www.booksellers.org.uk/industry/display_report.asp?id=419 
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Table 6.1: Book retail market shares by firm type 1995–200539 
 
Firm type 1995 2005 
Large/Multiple Stores 31 42 
Independent Stores 28 11 
Grocery multiple 1 8 
Mail order/Book clubs 9 16 
Internet / 11 
Other 31 12 
 
6.5 Table 6.2 provides, from an alternative source40 and for different 
categories, more detail on the individual market shares of the main 
players in more recent years.   
Table 6.2: 2001–2005 UK book retail market shares (%)41 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Waterstone's 16 16 16 16 14 
Ottakar's 6 5 6 7 8 
WH Smith, Borders & Blackwell 18 20 20 20 19 
Other specialists 14 10 10 11 11 
Supermarkets 4 4 5 6 8 
Internet 5 7 8 9 12 
Other distance sellers 21 21 19 18 15 
Other 16 17 16 13 13 
 
                                     
39 Davies, S.W., et al (2004), Ch 4. pg 42 and  
http://www.booksellers.org.uk/industry/display_report.asp?id=490  
40 There are therefore some small inconsistencies between Table 6.1 and 6.2.   
41 Competition Commission (2006), Appendix C, p.C4 Table 3.   
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This table is taken from Competition Commission (CC) (2006) and is 
treated as the authoritative source of market shares in our own 
calculations below.     
 
6.6 It confirms the increased importance of supermarkets and the internet in 
the market, with the number one Internet book retailer, Amazon, 
estimated to account for over 80 per cent of internet sales42 and offering 
a much wider range of titles than traditional retail outlets (see chapter 
10). In 2005 books was the second most popular category of product 
traded online, after music and videos and it has been estimated that the 
online book retailing will continue to expand and achieve a market share 
of 20 per cent by 2011.43 The impact of these new forms of retailers on 
the traditional bricks and mortar (B&M) retailers44 cannot be over 
emphasised. In 2006 HMV (Waterstone's) described themselves as: 
'caught in a 'pincer movement' between, on the one hand, the 
supermarkets offering a limited range but substantial discounts, both 
on best sellers and on an increasing number of deep-range titles, 
and, on the other hand, the Internet retailers offering a very 
extensive range.'45    
6.7 Returning to Table 6.2, individual market shares were not reported by 
CC for WHSmith, Borders and Blackwell for each of these years. 
However, estimates from another source for 2005 put their individual 
market shares at: WH Smith 12.8 per cent, Borders 5.5 per cent and 
                                     
42 Verdict (2007) p.23.  
43 Verdict (2007) pp.22 and 25.  
44 Here we use the term B&M retailer to refer to the traditional high street book retailers (chains 
and independents) thus excluding supermarket, internet, book clubs and other alternative 
forms of retailer.  
45 Competition Commission (2006), p.13.  
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Blackwell 2.4 per cent.46 Therefore, in 2005 there were four main chain-
store book retailers: Waterstone's, Ottakar's, WHSmith and Borders and 
this was reduced to three by the Waterstone's-Ottakar's merger in 
2006. Consequently, prior to the merger CR4 was already over 40 (the 
combined market share of the four largest firms).    
6.8 Within the main B&M retailers two very different business models have 
been adopted. Both WHSmith and Borders, in addition to books, also sell 
CDs, DVDs, computer games, newspapers magazines and stationary. 
Borders, a US based chain, only entered the UK market in 1997, initially 
by acquiring the small chain, Books etc, after the abolition of the NBA.47 
In contrast, Waterstone's, Ottakar's and WHSmith were all present in 
the market in the years preceding the abolition48 (see Appendix 2 for 
more detail on when each firm entered the market). Waterstone's (and 
Ottakars pre merger) in contrast focus solely on book retailing, WH 
Smith and Borders in contrast are more diversified. The typical 
Waterstone's store stocks 30-40,000 titles compared to only 10-20,000 
in the larger WHSmiths stores49 and Borders 20-30,000 in the Books etc 
stores and 50-80,000 in the Borders' superstores.50 The new entrant 
Borders therefore typically offers a wider range of titles and can 
therefore potentially benefits from economies of scope. In contrast the 
typical supermarket sells only about 250 titles,51 focusing on the 
                                     
46 Verdict (2007) p.5. NB the sum of these market shares slightly exceeds the combined share 
given in Table 6.2.  
47 Borders was very recently sold by its US owners, see: 
 http://books.guardian.co.uk/news/articles/0,,2174668,00.html.  
48 Between 1989 and 1998 Waterstone's was part of the WHSmith group.   
49 Verdict (2007), pp.9 and 16.  
50 Competition Commission (2006), p.17.  
51 Verdict (2007), p.27.  
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bestseller titles.52 Blackwell as a retailer specialises more in academic 
books and until recently was also present in the publishing market (see 
paragraph's 6.9-6.10). In addition to the evidence provided in Table 6.2, 
there is some additional evidence to suggest that Waterstone's sales 
have continued to fall since 2005,53 despite total industry sales 
continuing to increase.54 This may be indicative of further gains made by 
the Internet and supermarket retailers. 
Publishing sector 
6.9 Although there are over 10,000 book publishers in the UK,55 as Table 
6.3 shows the market is fairly highly concentrated with CR4=41 and 
thus fairly similar to the retail sector.   
                                     
52 Whilst the supermarkets sell a much smaller range of books they are an important competitor 
in the best-seller segment of the market because the top titles represent such a significant 
proportion of industry sales. In 2005 the top selling title had sales of £34m, the ninth best 
selling title £3m, the average sales for the titles ranked 10th -999th was £400,000 and titles 
ranked 1,000th – 4,999th £75,000, (Competition Commission (2006), p.8). In addition the 
Competition Commission (2006) merger enquiry found evidence of intense competition 
between B&M, supermarket and internet retailers for best sellers thus arguing that all retailer 
types should be included in the market definition.   
53 HMV Group plc Annual Reports and Accounts 2006.  
http://www.hmvgroup.com/files/1074/HMV_R_A_2006.pdf 
54 http://www.booksellers.org.uk/industry/display_report.asp?id=490.  
55 Competition Commission (2006). HMV Group plc and Ottakar's plc. Proposed acquisition of 
Ottakar's plc by HMV Group plc through Waterstone’s Booksellers Ltd. Appendix B.  
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Table 6.3: UK market shares (%) of major publishing groups in 2004 
and 200656 
 
 2004 2006 
Pearson Group 
Penguin 
Pearson Education 
12 
9 
3 
12 
9 
3 
Hachette Livre 9 12 
Random House 11 11 
HarperCollins 6 6 
OUP 4 4 
Macmillan 3 4 
Others 54 50 
 
6.10 In 2005 the top 10 publishers accounted for almost 95 per cent of all 
sales of fiction books.57 The sector has experienced increased 
consolidation in recent years in particular the expansion of Hachette 
Livre acquiring Hodder Headline in 2004 and then Time Warner Books 
and Philip Allan Updates in 2006, plus Random House acquiring BBC 
books in 2007 and Wiley completing the purchase of Blackwell 
Publishing in 2007 (Keynote 2007) and (Mintel 2007). However, at the 
same time there is evidence that the number of new publishers entering 
the industry has increased yearly from 2001 to 2006, with 2,801 new 
publishers entering in 2006.58   
                                     
56 Mintel (2007), p.39.  
57 Competition Commission (2007) p.9.  
58 http://www.booksellers.org.uk/industry/display_report.asp?id=419 
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7 DATA  
7.1 The two primary sources of data are the AMADEUS database, which we 
use to generate estimates of nominal turnover per head, and a price 
deflator with which to deflate the AMADEUS data. We describe each in 
turn in this section. 
Turnover, employment and productivity: AMADEUS  
7.2 The principal data used to compute productivity was obtained from the 
database: AMADEUS. This provides financial information for 
approximately nine million public and private companies across Europe.59  
It can be searched simultaneously by both country and 4-digit NACE 
code thus allowing us to focus on a set of firms of potential interest. 
However, for our purposes, the 4-digit NACE classification provides a 
too broad market definition and the next task was therefore to select the 
appropriate firms from within this sample. Our aim was to identify 
genuine book retailers and publishers with data available, and we 
restricted our attention to firms with five or more employees (although 
data was often not available for firms this small). This was done with 
the aid of supplementary industry sources.60 This enabled us to isolate 
and focus on 'genuine' book publishers and retailers within the chosen 
countries. 
7.3 Having established the relevant firms of interest, individual firm level 
data could then be obtained from the company reports available on 
AMADEUS Turnover (in thousand Euros) and the number of employees 
were available yearly for, in theory, the 10 years 1997–2006. As firms 
                                     
59 The AMADEUS is provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing.   
60 For the UK information on the main players from market research reports such as Verdict 
(2007) and Mintel (2007) combined with AMADEUS descriptions of firms' activities and 
company websites was sufficient. For Germany in addition to searching entries by NACE code 
lists of the top 100 publishers and the top 50 retailers were available from 
http://www.buchreport.de/   
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differed according to their reporting period, all figures were attributed to 
the calendar year in which the majority of the time period reported 
covered, with figures reported from July-June attributed to the later 
year. In addition, in a few cases figures were reported for time periods 
other than 12 months, in these cases the reported turnover figure was 
adjusted to the average for a twelve month period. In addition, for the 
UK firms in both publishing and retailing, data were extracted from 
AMADEUS on cost of sales, tangible and fixed assets and cost of 
employees.61 These were to be used in the Econometric analysis to 
estimate total factor productivity.  
7.4 In fact, we were also able to obtain an earlier version of AMADEUS (for 
2001), from which we were able to extend the data collection back to 
1989. Appendix 3 records, for publishing and retailing in each of the 
countries (the UK and Germany), the number of firms per year for which 
we were able to calculate labour productivity.62 One major problem, 
discussed later, is that there was often missing data for firms in some 
years. This was particularly a problem for smaller firms and meant that 
care needed to be taken in the analysis.   
Book prices  
7.5 All AMADEUS data are in nominal terms, and we require appropriate 
price deflators. As it happens, obtaining reliable and accurate price 
information on the book industry is notoriously difficult. As Allan and 
Curwen for example explain, the available price indices often do not take 
into account the volume of books sold (that is, a title selling 1 million 
copies carries the same weight in the index as a title selling 10,000 
copies) at any particular price or the quality of the product.63 In addition 
the common use of multi-buy offers in the book industry, such as three 
                                     
61 This data was typically not available for the German firms.  
62 This required turnover, number of employees and book price series data to be available.    
63 Allan and Curwen (1991), pp.59-60. 
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for the price of two offers, exacerbates the problem. Davies et al (2004) 
show that the different indices available can lead to substantially 
different conclusions on the price trend.64   
7.6 While much of this evidence is inconclusive, what is clear is that, since 
the abolition of the NBA, retailers have started to offer considerable 
discounts on the Recommended Retail Prices (RRPs) which have replaced 
the previous net-prices enforced by the publishers. Table 7.4 provides 
evidence of the average discounts offered both for best-sellers and the 
deep-range titles (in 2005 the top 5,000 titles accounted for 57 per cent 
of the total volume of UK book sales,65 titles outside the top 5,000 are 
referred to as deep-range titles.  
Table 7.4: Weighted average retail prices relative to RRP (excluding 
book clubs)66  
Year Best sellers Deep-range titles 
2001 0.88 0.93 
2002 0.84 0.93 
2003 0.82 0.92 
2004 0.80 0.90 
2005 0.75 0.90 
 
7.7 Not only is it clear that, on average, prices are significantly below the 
RRP, especially for best-sellers, these discounts are increasing over time. 
In addition for the top nine best-sellers in 2005 the average price was 
just over 0.60 of the RRP.67 Figure 6.1 suggests that diversity in titles 
published has also not been compromised despite this relative reduction 
                                     
64 Overall they find some evidence to support falling prices post abolition of the NBA. 
65 Competition Commission (2006) p.8.   
66 Competition Commission (2006), Appendix C, pp.8-9.  
67 Competition Commission (2006), Appendix C, p.10.  
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in the prices of best-sellers. Additional evidence suggests that RRPs have 
moved in different directions for different types of books. Thus 2003–
2007 RRPs on adult fiction books decreased by around four per cent 
whilst adult non-fiction prices increased by around 18 per cent.68  
UK book price indices used in productivity analysis 
7.8 The above information on RRPs and retailers' discounts is useful for 
establishing a picture of competition in the industry post-2000. 
However, since we will be calculating labour productivity over a much 
longer period, we need to have price data which is comparable both over 
this longer period and between countries. The remainder of this section 
will briefly consider the main price indices available for the UK (see 
paragraph's 9.11-9.14 for international comparisons of price indices).     
Publishers 
7.9 First, Figure 7.3 shows for 1991–2006 a producer price index for books. 
Clearly the prices charged by producers' over time have increased, with 
a slightly more rapid increase in the mid 1990s – around the time the 
NBA was abolished.69  
                                     
68 Mintel (2007) pg 32, based on evidence on RRPs from Holt Jackson, a firm specialising in 
supplying libraries rather than retail trade.   
69 This general increase in producer prices is not aligned with changes in the costs of the paper 
input which accounts for a reasonable proportion of the cost of producing a book (figures 
available only for 1993–1994 suggest just under 1/3 of the direct printing costs (Economics 
Branch (1995), p.38).  
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Figure 7.3: Producer price index (PPI) for books 70  
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However, it is not clear the extent to which this takes into account the 
discounts publishers and wholesalers offer to retailers. Estimates of the 
typical discounts currently offered include: independent retailers 35-45 
per cent, major chains 45-55 per cent, internet retailers 50-60 per cent, 
and supermarkets 55-65 per cent.71   
 
Retailers 
7.10 Next, Figure 7.4 contrasts the RPI index for books and newspapers with 
a general RPI index for the period 1987–2006: prices of books and 
newspapers have increased over time and more rapidly than the general 
RPI index.  
                                     
70 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/  
PPKA PPI: 2211000000: Books MM22 - Price indices of products manufactured and  
RABL PPI: 6112210000: GSI 21 Pulp, Paper & Paper Products MM22 - Price indices of fuels and 
materials purchased.  
71 Competition Commission (2006), p.23.   
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Figure 7.4: Retail price index (RPI) books and newspapers and all 
items72  
 
7.11 However, it is unclear whether the same would be true if we were able 
to distinguish books from newspapers. Moreover, we have lingering 
doubts as to whether this index accurately reflects the growing retail 
practice of offering 'three for the price of two'. The UK HICP index 
solely for books, shown in paragraph's 9.11-9.14, is similar to the RPI 
index for books and newspapers shown in Figure 7.4 and claims to 
measure prices faced by consumers including VAT and end of season 
sales prices. However this still remains unclear on multi-buy offers etc. 
In addition the RPI price index is very similar to an implicit price index for 
books from 1996–2006, which can be derived from Verdict (2007).73 
                                     
72 Books price index provided by the ONS, All items price index from:  
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=7172&More=N&All=Y 
73 Verdict (2007), pg 4, Table 1.  
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7.12 Finally Figure 7.5 compares the producer and retailer indices from 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. It is clear that until the late 1990s the 
two indices increased at very similar rates. Only significantly after the 
abolition of the NBA do retail prices appear to have increased more 
rapidly.   
7.13 While we are not 100 per cent confident that either of these indices fully 
captures the complexities of pricing behaviour in the industry, and while 
the retail index is also at a more aggregated level than just books, they 
will necessarily be used in subsequent analysis to calculate real 
productivity changes.  
Figure 7.5: Producer price index (PPI) books and retail price index 
(RPI) books and newspapers 
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8 ANALYSIS OF UK BOOK PRODUCTIVITY  
8.1 This section now applies the decomposition analysis to UK retailers and 
publishers in turn. Here the analysis is restricted to labour productivity 
(see Appendix 7 for the analysis of total factor productivity). We 
measure labour productivity as the ratio of turnover to employment: 
gross output per head. This is preferred to net output (value added) per 
head because we are not confident that the measures of net output 
which can be derived from AMADEUS are necessarily comparable across 
firms, over time or (most of all) across countries. In fact, for a product 
such as books, index numbers of net and gross output will move closely 
together over time in the absence of significant substitution between 
material inputs and the other factors of production, notably labour and 
capital.  
 UK B&M retailers 
8.2 As a starting point, Figure 8.6 reports the results of calculating nominal 
labour productivity, from 1990–2005, aggregating over all firms 
identified in AMADEUS as 'genuine'74 B&M book retailers.75 There are 14 
                                     
74 Simply searching AMADEUS by industry code is not sufficient. Book retailers are included in 
AMADEUS in the NACE group 5247: Retail sales of books, newspapers and stationary. Clearly 
therefore only some of the firms listed in this category were of interest for this study. A close 
cross-checking against independent, and authoritative, listings of book retailers reveals that 
AMADEUS reports as book retailers firms who do not retail books. These are excluded from 
our sample. 
75 Here and in all subsequent industry productivity analysis individual firm's contributions are 
weighted by their share of total employment (see paragraphs 5.2-5.8 equation (1)).  
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such firms (see Appendix 2 for details and Appendix 4 for the size 
distribution by turnover and number of employees). For the diversified 
retailers that is, WHSmith and Borders their turnover and employment 
figures were weighted accordingly.76   
Figure 8.6: Nominal labour productivity, UK B&M retailers, 1990–
2005 
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8.3 The results somewhat surprisingly show that, after a surge in 
productivity in the mid 1990s, nominal productivity growth has been 
stagnant since then, even declining within recent years. Figure 8.7 
reports the same data, deflated by the books RPI index described in the 
previous section.  Now that increasing book prices have been taken into 
account, the decline in labour productivity since the late 1990s is 
                                     
76The Competition Commission (2006) p.17, states that approximately 66 per cent of Borders 
superstore sales are accounted for by books. For WHSmith, based on Waterstone's market 
share and turnover, 22 per cent of its total turnover accounted for by books would give the 
correct market share of 12.8 per cent in 2005 (see Section 6.1). Therefore yearly figures for 
turnover and number of employees were reduced for Borders and Waterstone's by 66 per 
cent and 22 per cent respectively. Checking these figures with an industry source suggests 
that these figures are reasonable estimates.   
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substantially more severe (thus demonstrating the necessity of accurate 
price data. 
Figure 8.7: Real labour productivity, UK B&M retailers, 1990–2005  
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8.4 However, there are two important qualifications to be made: 
• this sample of 14 firms is unbalanced, in the sense that there are 
missing observations for some firms in some years (as discussed in 
paragraph's 7.2-7.4) This is not a matter of entry or exit since most 
of these firms survived the entire period (see Appendix 2) 
• the firms are all B&M, that is, the sample excludes both  internet and 
supermarket retailers. 
We now address each problem in turn. 
 
Balancing the sample: a robustness check 
8.5 Because the sample is unbalanced, there is a chance that the trends 
identified in Figures 8.6 and 8.7 are distorted by the changing make-up 
of the sample from year to year. In order to control for this, we have 
broken the full period down into two sub-periods, 1990–1996 and 
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1997–2005, and re-calculated the productivity time paths in each case 
based on a balanced sample for that sub-period (see Appendix 5).  
8.6 Fortunately, this confirms the productivity pattern shown in Figure 8.7. 
Figure 8.8 chain links the two sub-period series, rebased at 1997, and 
this confirms that real labour productivity exhibited three distinct phases:  
• 1990–1993: Constant/declining productivity  
• 1994–1996: Upward surge in productivity – as a result of the break-
down of the NBA? 
• 1997–2005: Significant decline in productivity   
Figure 8.8: Real labour productivity UK B&M retailers, 1990–2005 
(combining two balanced samples)77 
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77 Sample b/c used for 1997–2005 (see Appendix 5)).  
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1990–1996   
8.7 The evidence suggests, then, that in 1994–1996 there were substantial 
gains in labour productivity. This coincides with the abolition of the NBA 
and perhaps implies (as discussed earlier) that the break-up of the NBA 
occurred before its official abolition by the Restrictive Practises Court in 
1997. 
8.8 Table 8.5 reports the growth in real labour productivity, up to and after 
1993, for the four firms making up the balanced sample for the sub-
period 1990–1996.  
Table 8.5 – Firm real labour productivity % change, 1990–1996 
 
 1990-93 1993-96 
WHSmith -12 62 
Ottakar's -6.0 13.3 
Blackwell -19.0 5.8 
British Bookshops -9.0 39.3 
 
As can be seen, the productivity decline in the early 1990s was 
experienced by all four firms, and likewise for the subsequent gains, 
although particular gains were made by WHSmith and British 
Bookshops.  
 
The post-1997 decline 
8.9 Figure 8.8 also clearly confirms the decline in productivity from 1997 
onwards, suggested in Figure 8.7. In addition Appendix 5 shows that the 
inclusion of Waterstone's and Borders reduces the extent of the decline 
in productivity. Borders' entry to the market in 1997 arguably would not 
have occurred had the fixed price regime continued. The following quote 
from The Bookseller industry publication in 1997 highlights this: 
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'(some booksellers) expressed fears that expansion of the US chains 
on the UK high street would be as 'reckless' as it had been in the 
US, and that a price war would break out.'78  
This would seem to provide a clear indication that discounting is key to 
their business model.   
 
8.10 Given the striking decline in productivity since 1999, this merits a closer, 
disaggregated examination. Table 8.6 reports the change in real labour 
productivity from 1999–2005 for each of the nine firms in sample (c). 
 
Table 8.6: Firm real labour productivity % change, 1999–2005 
 
 % change (1999-2005) 
Borders 5.0 
Blackwell 3.1 
Same Day Books 1.8 
David Flatman -17.3 
British Bookshops -17.9 
Waterstone's -25.3 
WH Smith -29.7 
Ottakar's -34.8 
Galloway & Porter -46.4 
 
8.11 Amongst the four main B&M retailers, it is apparent that only Borders 
made productivity gains (although small) through this period, in contrast 
all of the other main players made substantial productivity losses. The 
firm making the largest productivity losses - Galloway & Porter - is the 
smallest firm in this sample, with a single store. However other 
                                     
78 http://www.thebookseller.com/documents/BordersbuysBooksEtc-3rdOctober1997.pdf 
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substantial sized retail chains also made significant losses. Also, worth 
noting is the fact that the worst performing retailer over this period was 
Galloway & Porter a small, single store independent retailer.  
8.12 Further insight into the declining productivity can be gained from Figure 
8.9, which compares the total nominal turnover of the nine firms in 
Table 8.6 with the exception of Borders with a series for total industry 
turnover79 with both indexed to 100 in 2000.  
Figure 8.9: Total nominal turnover for a sample of selected UK B&M 
retailers and the book industry overall, 2000–2005   
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8.13 Since 2000 the B&M retailers' turnover has remained constant in 
nominal terms (therefore fallen in real terms). When viewed alongside 
the increasing turnover for the retail book industry as a whole this 
underlines just how significant the increases in market share of the 
newly entered supermarket retailers, Amazon and Borders must have 
been. Borders' turnover increased rapidly especially initially following 
                                     
79 This is the total value of industry sales, as reported in Verdict (2007) p.4 Table 1, i.e. the 
nominal value equivalent of the physical volumes shown earlier in Figure 6.1.  
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entry – evidence of a between firm effect driven by within firm 
productivity gains (see Table 8.6).80     
 Introducing the supermarkets and Amazon 
8.14 The above analysis has considered the productivity of B&M book 
retailers and therefore importantly omits the supermarket and internet 
retailers. Including these alternative retailers is problematic, and it is to 
this that we now turn. 
The supermarkets 
8.15 Unsurprisingly, AMADEUS does not report disaggregated data for either 
the turnover or employment in selling books of the supermarkets: 
supermarkets do not typically report such information on a product-
specific basis in their company accounts. For turnover, this is not a 
problem, since we have the CC's estimates for supermarkets in 
aggregate, 2001–2005, but, for employment, we face a problem which 
is both practical and conceptual. Given the way that supermarkets are 
organised, it is probably a meaningless question to ask what proportion 
of a supermarket's staff are engaged specifically on selling books: there 
is no real demarcation of staff on product lines.    
8.16 As such, any estimate of the productivity of supermarkets in bookselling 
is bound to be notional and to a large extent arbitrary. In these 
circumstances, we prefer not to generate any particular point estimate of 
their productivity, but rather confine ourselves to establishing what 
might be a plausible range of estimates which can then be used in a 
sensitivity analysis (see below). To do this, we use two pieces of 
indirect evidence. 
                                     
80 Evidence suggests Borders market share has continued to rise, see: 
http://books.guardian.co.uk/news/articles/0,,2174668,00.html.  
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8.17 First, we estimate the difference in space-productivity, (that is, sales per 
sq ft of store space devoted to books) between supermarkets and 
Waterstone's and Ottakar's. For the supermarkets this was estimated to 
be currently £900 p.a.81 (Interestingly, the estimate for aggregate 
supermarket superstore sales generally is £1,100 per sqft.8283)  
According to the same source, this is approximately three times as high 
as the typical space productivity in Waterstone's and Ottakar's 2001–
2007. This could imply a similar multiple in labour productivity - on the 
(un-testable) assumption that the ratio of space to employment was 
identical in supermarkets and Waterstone's and Ottakar's.  
8.18 Second, we can compare the aggregate labour productivity of 
supermarkets, (on sales of all products), with Waterstone's and 
Ottakar's. Using AMADEUS's figures for aggregate turnover and 
employment in Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury combined, labour productivity 
in 2005 was about 1.5 times the level it was in Waterstone's and 
Ottakar's. This would imply a similar multiple in labour productivity – on 
the (un-testable) assumption that supermarket labour productivity when 
selling books is identical to that for all products.   
Amazon 
8.19 For the internet sellers, we face similar problems. Although we have 
corroborated and consistent estimates of their aggregate market share 
(from both the CC and industry reports, for example, Verdict), data on 
employment are unavailable. For example, in a current report by Keynote 
                                     
81 Verdict (2007), p.27.  
82 Verdict (2007), p.27.  
83 It has been suggested that, because supermarkets achieve lower space productivity on books 
than for other products, this may persuade them not to continue their rapid expansion into 
book retailing. However, Tesco, the largest UK supermarket chain, currently offers the widest 
book selection among supermarkets and increased its book sales by 50 per cent in 2005 with 
rapid growth continuing since then. Evidence suggests it will expand its book sales further as 
it opens additional large stores (Mintel, 2007) p.54.   
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(2007, p.26), Amazon's employment is recorded simply as 'not known'.  
Moreover, even if the total employment of these firms were known, it 
must be remembered that, as for the supermarkets, it is somewhat 
meaningless to ask what proportion of their employees are dedicated to 
selling books, as opposed to the many other products they sell. A third 
complication derives from the business model employed by internet 
sellers (certainly Amazon): while the majority of their sales are sourced 
directly from their own fulfilment centres/warehouses, a significant 
proportion is sourced from independent booksellers around the world.  
For these latter sales, Amazon plays a role which is more akin to agent 
than retailer. While these sales will be included in the above estimates of 
Amazon's market share, they will involve only minimal factor (including 
labour) inputs from Amazon itself. This will therefore tend to exaggerate 
Amazon's labour productivity 
8.20 Again, therefore, any estimate of the productivity of book selling will be 
notional. As for supermarkets, we try to marshal whatever information is 
available. We concentrate on Amazon, the main online seller.  
8.21 First, Table 8.7, imputes the value of Amazon's book sales from Verdict 
data on internet book selling.84 These are consistent with the CC's 
estimates of the online market share. 
Table 8.7 – Amazon's book sales 
Year 
Online  
Spend £m 
Amazon  
Online  
Share (%) 
Estimated 
Amazon 
Sales (Nominal) £m 
2004 317 86.7 275 
2005 367 80.9 297 
2006 438 86.1 377 
 
                                     
84 Derived from Verdict (2007) Table 8 p.20 and Figure 6 p.23.  
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8.22 Second, using press releases and business news websites, we estimate 
the approximate aggregate level of employment in Amazon’s UK sites85 
in 2005, this was approximately 1000. If all these employees were 
dedicated to selling only books, labour productivity would be £377,000, 
as opposed to approximately £100,000 in Waterstones and Ottakars: a 
multiple of 3.77.86 However, adjustments need to be made for: (i) non-
book sales, and (ii) sales under the Amazon name which are in fact 
sourced by independent book sellers (agency sales.)  We have no 
information on either, but it is instructive to estimate how the multiple 
might change if we assume that no more than 60 per cent of sales are 
books87 and that no more than 10 per cent of sales are agency sales88. 
On those assumptions, the Amazon/Waterstones-Ottakars multiple 
would rise from 3.77 to 5.66. 
Estimating the decomposition into between- and within-firm 
effects, under different scenarios 
8.23 We are now in a position to illustrate how the methodology can be 
expanded to include all main players in the industry, and not just the 
B&M retailers in our sample. To do this, we employ the CC market share 
estimates, reported in our earlier Table 6.2, to weight the productivity 
                                     
85 The Corporate centre at Slough and Fulfillment Centres in Milton Keynes, Glenrothes and 
Gourock. 
86 A multiple of just over 3.6 is obtained if Waterstone's productivity figure is compared with 
Amazon's 2006 worldwide labour productivity across all products, calculated from Amazon's 
2006 Annual Report: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-
reportsAnnual  
87 Amazon's 2006 Annual Report, cites 'Media' as accounting for 72 per cent of Amazon 
International's worldwide sales.  However, this will include CDs, DVDs etc as well as books.  
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-reportsAnnual 
88  An industry expert confirmed that this figure might be in the right ballpark. Unfortunately, 
enquiries to Amazon itself on these questions proved unproductive. 
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figures calculated from AMADEUS for each firm, or category of retailer, 
and to include a range of alternative productivity estimates for the 
supermarkets and internet sellers (weighted by their accurate CC market 
shares). At this stage also we effectively correct for the under 
representation of smaller retailers in our sample by assuming that our 
productivity estimates for the sample of small firms are representative of 
all small firms.  
8.24 As a baseline, used merely for illustrative purposes, Figure 8.10 and 
Table 8.8 present the results on the assumption that the internet and 
supermarket retailers maintained a productivity level fixed at three times 
Waterstone's level in 2005 (see Appendix 6 for the detailed break-down 
of the analysis involved in this base case). Under this assumption, 
aggregate industry productivity would have increased by just over eight 
per cent from 2001–2005 – even assuming no within-firm productivity 
growth by the supermarket and internet sellers.89 
8.25 Thus, as shown in Figure 8.10, while the traditional retailers experienced 
falling within-firm productivity during this period, if the above 
supermarkets/internet retailers multiple is correct, the negative within-
firm effect for B&M would have been more than outweighed by a larger 
between-firm effect in favour of the significantly more efficient 
supermarket and internet retailer entrants.   
                                     
89   Using AMADEUS, we estimate that the supermarkets were increasing their aggregate (that 
is, on all products) nominal labour productivity by about three per cent p.a. over this period 
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Figure 8.10: Aggregate, within and between firm productivity 
changes, 2001–2005: assuming supermarkets/internet productivity 
is three times that of Waterstone's 
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Table 8.8: Aggregate, within and between firm productivity absolute 
and % changes, 2001–2005  
 Absolute change % change 
Aggregate 3.8 4.3 
Within -12.5 -12.1 
Between 16.2 18.8 
 
8.26 Table 8.8 quantifies the decomposition in terms of both percentage and 
absolute changes in productivity (calculated in Appendix 6).90 
                                     
90  Given the nature of this particular decomposition, it ‘adds up’ exactly in absolute terms, but 
not quite in percentage terms.  
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Alternative assumptions 
8.27 This assumed threefold productivity multiple in favour of the 
supermarkets and internet sellers is not out of line with the indirect 
estimates we presented above (being perhaps near the top end for 
supermarkets, but by no means for the internet). But we stress again 
that it is presented mainly for illustrative purposes. To provide more 
context, and as a sensitivity test, Table 8.9 next presents some 
alternative results in which we vary the assumed multiple. Thus, the first 
row shows that, in the unlikely event that supermarket and internet 
retailers had identical productivity to Waterstone's in 2005, the 
industry's aggregate productivity would have fallen by over 16 per cent, 
with now virtually no positive between-firm effect.  
Table 8.9: % changes in productivity from 2001–2005 – under 
alternative assumptions for productivity multiple between 
Amazon/supermarkets and Waterstone's  
 
Productivity multiple Aggregate Within Between 
1 -16.3 -16.8 0.6 
1.5 -10.5 -15.4 5.7 
2 -5.2 -14.1 10.4 
2.5 0 -13.0 14.9 
3 4.3 -12.1 18.8 
4 12.5 -10.7 26 
5 19.7 -9.5 32.2 
 
8.28 The subsequent rows show the effect of increasing the multiple: clearly, 
the higher is the multiple, the more important is the between-firm effect, 
and the faster industry productivity grows. As can be seen, a multiple of 
2.5, would be just sufficient for the two effects to balance, leaving 
aggregate productivity unchanged. More optimistically, at a multiple of 
4, the industry would have achieved a 12.5 per cent growth in 
productivity – nearly 2.5 per cent p.a. The figure would be higher than 
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this to the extent that the supermarkets and internet sellers achieved 
positive within-firm increases in productivity. 
Summary of UK retail  
8.29 As this section has covered a lot of ground, a brief summary is in order 
before we turn to the publishing sector. 
8.30 At the time of abolition of the NBA, there was a surge in the productivity 
of the B&M retailers. However, their nominal turnover soon dropped 
sharply and then declined steadily thereafter - despite the fact that the 
aggregate volumes of books sold and prices were both increasing. 
8.31 It is likely that declining volumes sold by B&M were the result of entry 
from internet/supermarkets, and these reduced volumes were the 
primary cause of their falling productivity – at least in the short/medium 
run. In that sense, increased competition had a short-run deflationary 
effect on industry productivity. 
8.32 However, on the not unreasonable assumption that the new entrants 
were more efficient, this will have led to a positive between-firm effect 
on aggregate industry productivity. Our estimates suggests that a 
productivity multiple in the region of 2.5 would have been sufficient for 
the two effects to roughly balance.  
8.33 From the incomplete and inconclusive evidence at our disposal, we can 
not be sure whether or not the actual multiple exceeded this level, but, 
in our opinion, it is likely that it did.  
8.34 At this preliminary stage, we raise two questions. The first is factual – 
can the entry of the supermarkets and internet sellers on such a scale be 
attributed to the abolition of NBA? Certainly, it is true that the 
supermarkets were amongst those calling for the abolition of NBA at the 
time, and informed opinion suggests that there is a degree of causality, 
but we can not be sure. One way to test this is to use a counter-factual.  
Germany is an obvious candidate for this, in that it has retained RPM.  
We therefore return to this question in paragraph's 9.4-9.9 and 
paragraph's 9.15-9.18. The second question is a query concerning the 
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response of B&M retailers.  Faced with falling demand as a consequence 
of new low price entrants, it is not surprising that their productivity 
initially fell. Downsizing and consolidation can rarely be achieved 
instantaneously. What is perhaps surprising is that their steady decline 
has continued for so long after the new entry began to bite.  Perhaps the 
recent Waterstone's/Ottakar's merger is a belated response? In particular 
given the efficiency defence put forward by the merging parties (see 
chapter 10). 
UK publishers  
8.35 This section now conducts a similar productivity analysis for the UK 
publishing sector over the same time period. Firstly, Figure 8.11 uses the 
data on each of the 49 'genuine'91 book publishers reported in Amadeus 
to calculate the aggregate industry labour productivity (see Appendix 4 
for size distributions by turnover and number of employees for these 49 
firms). This has been deflated by the PPI described in the previous 
section. Clearly, productivity increases in general through the period with 
a particular surge in the late 1990s.92 
                                     
91  As for book retailing, we checked against independent industry sources to confirm that all 
firms labelled as book publishers in AMADEUS are indeed book publishers.  Those that were 
no were excluded. 
92 Further inspection of the data suggests that this overall trend of productivity gains was driven 
by turnover increasing more rapidly than the number of workers employed.  
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Figure 8.11: UK publishers' real labour productivity, 1991–2006  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Year
R
ea
l L
ab
ou
r 
P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
(1
99
7=
10
0)
 
8.36 As for retailing above, this sample is not balanced, and so we undertook 
two robustness checks. First, the exercise was repeated for a balanced 
sample (of 20 firms) for which data are available throughout the period.  
Second, it was repeated for the subset of six large publishing groups 
within the latter.93 This subset is as described earlier in Table 6.3, and it 
makes up the large publishing groups present in the industry.94 
                                     
93 All firms in Table 6.3 except for OUP, treating Penguin and Pearson Education (Pearson 
Group) separately.  
94 Of the firms described in Table 6.3 only OUP cannot be included due to lack of data. 
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Figure 8.12: UK publishers' real labour productivity, 1991–2006 
(alternative samples)  
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8.37 Figure 8.12 confirms that the general trend shown in Figure 8.11 
continues to hold for these two subsets of firms, albeit with some 
indication that the largest publishers performed slightly worse than other 
publishers in the early 1990s but slightly better from the later 1990s 
onwards.  
8.38 Table 8.10 next compares productivity growth for the pre NBA period 
and for the years after the NBA (or at least when the evidence suggests 
the NBA had effectively ended). To control for a possible size bias in our 
sample (which contains all the main large publishers firms, but it only 
includes data on a selection of the smaller publishers (the 16 in the 
balanced sample)), our calculation of industry productivity is a weighted 
average of the small and large publishers' productivity growths. The 
weights relate to the large and smaller firms share in the industry rather 
than just this sample. In other words, the small firm contribution is 
grossed up to counteract this under-representation of small firms in our 
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sample. The weights used for the start and end of each period are given 
in the last row of the table.95  
Table 8.10: UK publishers real labour productivity growth % change, 
1992–2005 
 1992-95 1995-05 
Total 
26.3  
(8.7 p.a.) 
55.1  
(5.5 p.a.) 
Large -2.5 82.9 
Small 49.9 42.1 
Weight small (%) 57-64 64-61 
 
8.39 In terms of average annual productivity growth, this suggests that 
productivity increased more rapidly prior to the abolition of the NBA. The 
table also disaggregates productivity gains between the small publishers 
and the large publishing groups. This confirms the earlier suggestion that 
the significant productivity gains made by the large publishers only 
occurred post-abolition.   
8.40 Finally, Table 8.11 reports the results from using the methodology 
described earlier (see paragraph's 5.2-5.8) to decompose the 
productivity growth in the two periods into within and between firm 
effects.  
                                     
95 These weights were calculated using a figure for the total market size in 2004 available from 
Mintel (2007), p.39. Keeping the ratio between the turnover of small firms in our balanced 
sample and the turnover of all small firms constant over time (around 50 per cent) provided 
an estimate of the total market share of the small firms. This was then used to weight the 
productivity of the small firms based on the productivity figures calculated for the small firms 
with available data.  
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Table 8.11: UK publishers' real labour productivity % changes, 
1992–2005 (aggregate, within and between firms)  
 
 1992–1995 1995–2005 
Aggregate 26.3 55.1 
Within firm 20.5 59.5 
Between firm 4.8 -2.8 
 
8.41 It is clear that the majority of the productivity gains have been due to 
within firm gains that is, a reduction in x-inefficiency. In the latter period 
the between firm effects is actually negative, although insignificant over 
a 10 year period.  
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9 INTERNATIONAL COMPARATORS 
Rationale 
9.1 As well as using the UK book industry pre-abolition as a comparator to 
UK performance post-abolition, it was an initial objective of the project 
to employ international comparisons – with countries which have 
retained RPM - as an alternative source of counterfactual (see 
paragraph's 5.10-5.15).   
9.2 Germany and the UK had the two largest book industries in Europe in 
2000, together accounting for 56 per cent (Germany 35 per cent and 
the UK 21 per cent) of the total book sales value of the EU-15 
countries.96 This, coupled with the fact that Germany, unlike the UK, has 
a fixed book price system (which, as discussed in paragraph's 2.4-2.6, 
appears to be heavily enforced) makes it a natural comparator country.97  
In addition as Table 9.12 shows, both countries have an above average 
range of book titles available per capita. One other interesting difference 
                                     
96 European Commission (2004a) p.15.  
97 It was also envisaged that a bilateral comparison between Sweden (free prices) and Denmark 
(fixed prices) might offer useful perspectives for a different reason. while in many other 
respects the two countries are similar. Interestingly, the sale of re-imported Danish titles from 
Sweden, at unrestricted prices and a publisher’s use of its book club subsidiary to undercut 
fixed prices have been issues of considerable competition authority interest (see 
http://www.ks.dk/english/competition/national-decisions/national-decisions-before-
2004/2003-09-24-fixed-book-prices-by-reimport-of-danish-books-to-denmark/  
    and http://www.ks.dk/english/competition/national-decisions/national-decisions-2004/2004-
05-26-publishers-must-allow-equal-terms-of-competition-to-book-retailers/) 
    However, this comparison was unsuccessful mainly due to the poor availability of data. The 
problem of missing observations was substantially more severe than in the UK and Germany, 
thus making it impossible to obtain a balanced sample. In addition, less information on these 
markets and typically smaller firms exacerbated the problems. For these reasons the 
productivity comparison between Denmark and Sweden has been omitted from the final 
report. 
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is that VAT is not imposed on books in the UK whilst in Germany it is 
seven per cent (however lower than their standard VAT rate).98 It is also 
interesting to note from Table 9.12 the UK book industry's rapid 
turnover growth between 1995-2000 which was significantly greater 
than the equivalent figure for Germany and the overall EU average.    
Table 9.12: Book publishing in selected EU countries circa 200299  
 
 
Titles produced in 
2002 per million 
population 
Titles in print per 
million population 
Turnover % 
of GDP 
Turnover 
growth rate 
1995-2000 
Denmark 499 9348 0.36 30.9 
France 496 7560 0.34 3.3 
Germany 242 11680 0.33 14.2 
Italy 597 7528 0.4 40.5 
Spain 758 6208 0.42 1.4 
Sweden 406 N/A 0.365 -2.3 
UK 1404 18827 0.43 57.1 
EU 
Average 
808 9993 0.41 17.60 
 
9.3 Paragraph's 9.15-9.18 will therefore make productivity comparisons 
between UK and German book publishers and retailers. First however, 
paragraph's 9.4-9.14 describes the German book industry and the book 
price indices available for use in the productivity analysis.   
German Book Industry  
9.4 Figure 9.13 compares the number of new titles produced in Germany 
from 2000 to 2006 with the UK figures from the earlier Figure 6.2. 
Throughout the period the number of new titles is lower in Germany and 
                                     
98 European Commission (2004a) p.83.  
99 European Commission, (2003), p.79.  
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it is clear that Germany did not also experience the recent growth in the 
number of titles in the UK.  
Figure 9.13: The number of new book titles produced in Germany 
and the UK, 2000–2006100  
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German retailers  
9.5 Table 9.13 shows the corresponding market shares for the main German 
book retailers (excluding the main internet retailer Amazon due to data 
availability).  
                                     
100German data for first and new editions from http://www.boersenverein.de/de/64586,UK data 
as Figure 6.2.  
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Table 9.13: Market shares of the top 10 German book retailers in 
2005 (excluding Amazon)101 
 
Firm 
Market share  
within top 50 (%) 
DBH Buch Handels 27 
Thalia 26 
Schweitzer Sortiment 5 
Mayersche Buchhandlung 5 
Karstadt Warenhaus 4 
Kaufhof 3 
Lehmanns Fachbuchhandlung 3 
Buch & Kunst 3 
Osiander 1 
Pustet 1 
 
9.6 In 2005, Weldbildplus and Heinrich Hugendubel, the second and third 
largest retailers, announced their intention to merger thus forming DBH 
Buch Handels the number one in Germany.102 The CR4 level of 63 shows 
that the market has become highly concentrated and is substantially 
more concentrated than both the UK publishing and retail sectors (see 
paragraph's 6.4-6.8 and 6.9-6.10) and the German publishing sector 
described in the previous section. 
9.7 Table 9.14 then goes on to describe the evolution over recent years of 
the market shares of the different categories of retailer operating in the 
                                     
101 Market shares as a proportion of the Top 50 German retailers ranked by 2005 turnover. Data 
from http://www.buchreport.de/.  All 10 of these firms are included in the subsequent 
productivity analysis except for Karstadt Warenhaus and Kaufhof (both department stores) 
and Lehmanns Fachbuchhandlung (mainly a publisher).  
102 www.buchreport.de  
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sector, using reliable data from the German Bookseller Association. It is 
apparent that the traditional high-street retailers have had some erosion 
of their share of the market, although this is far less severe than in the 
UK market (as seen earlier in Tables 6.1 and 6.2). Additional information 
suggests the decline in the number of small/independent outlets in the 
UK has not occurred to the same extent in Germany.103  Whilst it is 
difficult to make accurate comparisons, due to the different categories 
used,104 assuming supermarkets (in particular discount stores) make up 
only part of the others category, this suggests supermarket retailers 
have a much less substantial market share than the eight per cent 
observed in the UK market in 2005 (see Table 6.2).  
Table 9.14: The German book retail market by retailer type, 2003–
2005 105 
 2003 2004 2005 
High-street 56.5 55.8 54.8 
Publishers direct sales 17.3 17.7 17.6 
Offline, mail order and door to door sales 5 4.3 4.3 
Online 4.4 5.6 6.9 
Dept stores 4.5 4.4 4.3 
Book Clubs 3.4 3.3 3.2 
Others 
(incl. discount stores e.g. Aldi and kiosks) 
8.8 9 8.9 
 
9.8 In addition, it is clear from Table 9.14 that the online book retailers have, 
like in the UK, experienced considerable growth in recent years. This 
                                     
103 For example in 2004 the top 100 booksellers accounted for only around 35 per cent of 
industry turnover (Publishers Association (2006)).  
104 The sample of German retailers for which productivity analysis is possible are included in the 
high-street category of Table 9.14 and this category broadly corresponds to our definition of 
B&M retailers in the UK.   
105 Data from http://www.boersenverein.de/de/65916.  
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was achieved from a market share of less than 0.5 per cent in 1998.106 
Amazon entered the German and UK markets simultaneously in 1998 
and are also the dominant internet book retailer in Germany. Figure 9.14 
compares the growth of the UK and German online market shares from 
2001-2006 (where available). It can be seen that, whilst both online 
markets have grown at relatively similar rates, the online market share is 
more substantial in the UK (therefore suggesting more rapid expansion 
pre 2001) and grew more rapidly in the last available year for which 
comparator data is available.  
Figure 9.14: The online market share in German and the UK book 
retailing107  
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106 http://www.readingeurope.org/observatory.nsf?open 
107 UK data as Table 6.2. German data from: http://www.boersenverein.de/de/65916  except 
2000 from: http://www.channelpartner.de/sonstiges/622073/index.html. (data not available 
for Germany in 2001 and 2002).    
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9.9 Although by no means conclusive, this evidence seems to suggest that 
whilst the entry of non-traditional retailers in the UK since the late 1990s 
has also occurred in Germany, it has been to a lesser extent. One 
explanation for this is the inability of these retailers to price freely in 
Germany (at least for German language books). In contrast Amazon 
appears to be particularly strong in sales of English books in Germany. 
Although detailed sales figures are not available it has been estimated 
that in 2005 they accounted for around 30 per cent of English language 
book sales in Germany,108 this would seem to indicate the key role the 
ability to price freely plays in their business model. Survey results from 
the UK regarding online purchases in general that is, not just books, 
provides additional evidence that price is one of the key factors driving 
demand for products sold online.109 In addition it is also worth noting 
that Borders has not entered the German retail book market.      
German publishers  
9.10 Table 9.15 provides the market shares for the main publishing firms in 
the German market:  
                                     
108 Publishers Association (2006), p.19.    
109 See http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft921h.pdf, p.39.  
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Table 9.15: Market shares of the top 10 German publishers in 
2006110    
Firm 
Market share 
within top 50 (%) 
Springer Science + Business Media 12 
Klett-Gruppe 8 
Cornelsen Verlagsgruppe 7 
Westermann Verlagsgruppe 4 
Random House 4 
Weltbild 4 
Weka Firmengruppe 4 
Wolters Kluwer Deutschland 4 
Mair Du Mont 3 
Haufe Gruppe 3 
 
The CR4 level of 31 is significantly lower than the corresponding level 
for the UK (see paragraph's 6.9-6.10).111 
 
EU, German and UK book price indices 
9.11 In the next section, the labour productivity results for the UK book 
publishers and retailers will be contrasted with the equivalent for the 
German book industry. Again, it is first necessary to deflate turnover into 
real terms. To the best of our knowledge the only book price series 
                                     
110 Market share as a proportion of the top 50 German publishers ranked by 2006 turnover. Data 
from http://www.buchreport.de/. All 10 of these firms were included in the subsequent 
productivity analysis with the exception of Random House, Wolters Kluwer Deutschland, Mair 
du Mont and Haufe Gruppe where data was not available.   
111 Additional information suggests sub groups within the German publishing industry are 
substantially more concentrated, for example in 2002 the CR4 level for publishers in the 
mass market paperback sector was around 74, see European Commission (2004a), p.48.    
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available for this purpose are the European Harmonised Indices of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) books component which is available from 1996-
2006.112 
9.12 These price series allow us to compare and control changes in the prices 
of books across this period.113 First of all Figure 9.15 compares the EU 
average for the books component with the EU average for all items. It is 
apparent that generally across Europe book prices have increased at a 
similar rate to other retail items. 
                                     
112 The same questions over the accuracy of the RPI index discussed in paragraph's 7.5-7.13 
also apply to these HICP indices. For common years comparing the HICP book index for the 
UK with the RPI index for UK books (shown in Figure 7.4) shows no substantial differences.  
113 As Stockmann (2004) p.55, explains, there is very little empirical work comparing actual 
book price levels between countries. One exception discussed is Fjeldstad (2001) which finds 
significantly lower prices in Sweden (free prices) than Norway (fixed prices) despite higher 
VAT on books in Sweden.  However, population levels and dual language school books in 
Norway arguably contribute to this result.  
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Figure 9.15: HICP indices for books and all items in the EU, 1996–
2005114 
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9.13 Figure 9.16 then compares the increase in books prices in the UK and 
Germany from 1996–2006 and also includes the average change in book 
prices across the EU. Prices in the UK have increased at a similar rate to 
those across the EU, whilst in Germany from around 2001 onwards 
prices increased less rapidly. 
                                     
114Eurostat:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_3307
6576&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
    Harmonized indices of consumer prices (2005=100) – Annual Data (average index and rate 
of change) infotype avx Annual average index coicop cp0951 Books. 
 
  
  
OFT981 86 
 
 
Figure 9.16: HICP indices for books in Germany, the UK and the EU, 
1996–2005115 
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9.14 Whilst Figure 9.16 only compares changes in the price levels between 
countries there is however, also some limited recent evidence to suggest 
that the level of average book prices in Germany were not significantly 
different from the UK.116   
International productivity comparisons   
9.15 Paragraph's 8.2-8.13 showed that for the UK traditional retailers in 
recent years productivity has fallen. However, once the impact of the 
internet and supermarket retailers is taken into account under plausible 
assumptions it is possible industry productivity in fact increased overall. 
Paragraph's 9.5-9.9 suggested that the entry of internet and 
                                     
115Eurostat:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_3307
6576&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
Harmonized indices of consumer prices (2005=100) - Annual Data (average index and rate of 
change) infotype avx Annual average index coicop cp0951 Books and coicop cp00 All-items.  
116 Publishers Association (2006) p.22.  
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supermarket retailers has been less significant in Germany. In addition, 
because even less information is available on the German market it will 
not be possible to analyse the impact of these new book retailers on 
productivity in Germany even using somewhat speculative approach 
adopted in paragraph's 8.14-8.28. Instead this section provides some 
insights by comparing the productivity of the traditional B&M retailers in 
Germany and the UK over time. Therefore, Figure 9.17 contrasts the 
productivity change in UK book retailing (shown earlier in Figure 8.7) 
with the equivalent for the German book retailing sector (in total 53 
firms)117 from 1996–2005. 
Figure 9.17: Bricks and mortar book retailers in Germany and the 
UK, real labour productivity,118 1996–2005  
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9.16 This suggests that the substantial decline in productivity experienced by 
the UK retail sector has not occurred in Germany, where real labour 
productivity has remained fairly constant until increasing latterly. This 
                                     
117 Although an unbalanced sample. See Appendix 4 for the size distribution by turnover and 
number of employees.  
118 German turnover figures deflated using HICP price index for books in Germany as shown in 
Figure 9.16.  
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suggests that the impact on traditional retailers of entry by Internet and 
supermarkets was, as argued earlier, at least in part facilitated by the 
move to a free price system.  
9.17 Figure 9.18 provides similar comparison for the publishing sector, 
combining the earlier information from Figure 8.11 with the equivalent 
for Germany (in total 41 firms)119 for the period 1996–2005.  
Figure 9.18: Book publishers in Germany and the UK, real labour 
productivity120 1996–2005  
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9.18 Whilst the figures for Germany are volatile due to data problems (in 
particular the unbalanced sample), this still provides a useful 
counterfactual and puts the post NBA productivity performance of the 
UK in a better light. It is clear that whilst there have been no overall 
productivity gains in the German publishing the overall trend in the UK 
has been for productivity growth. The contrasting book publishing 
turnover growth rates between Germany and the UK shown in Table 
                                     
119 See Appendix 4 for the size distribution by turnover and number of employees.  
120 German turnover figures deflated using HICP price index for books in Germany as shown in 
Figure 9.16.  
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9.12 would also support this finding. A tentative conclusion is that 
productivity growth would have been lower in the UK during this period 
if the NBA had not been abolished. Unfortunately comparisons pre 1996 
are not possible.          
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10 INNOVATION, PRODUCT QUALITY AND CHOICE 
10.1 Although the statistical methodology described in paragraph's 5.2-5.9 
does not explicitly incorporate an innovation dimension, it will 
nevertheless capture some of the effects of innovation, albeit indirectly. 
10.2 It is useful to separate innovation into three categories: 
• process innovation. In the present case, this would refer to the 
invention or, probably more important, diffusion of new technologies 
for publishing and selling books 
• product innovation. Here, this would refer to improvements in the 
quality and range of (i) book manuscripts from authors, (ii) published 
books (for example, better quality reproduction of pictures and text, 
improvements in binding etc), and in (iii) the 'retail experience' (for 
example, enhancements to accessibility in retail stores) 
• improved (and increased diversity in) business models. 
10.3 The effects on productivity of process innovation should be captured in 
our methodology by the within-firm component of growth in 
productivity.  The effects of new business models, will be captured by 
the between-firm effect, insofar as firms entering on the back of 
(productivity-enhancing) new business models, such as internet or 
supermarket selling, will grow in relative terms.  
10.4 Indeed, as explained earlier (paragraph's 4.2-4.4), at the time of the 
decision to abolish the NBA in 1997, it was technological developments 
and the introduction of new business practices that had helped to 
alleviate earlier fears of possible adverse effects of abolition. More 
recently, it is worth noting the importance of the efficiency defence, 
attached by the parties in the Waterstone's/Ottakar's merger, suggesting 
efficiency gains that would follow from integrating Waterstone's superior 
stock management system into Ottakar's operations.121 It was argued 
                                     
121 Competition Commission (2006), p.13.  
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that these efficiency gains would help Waterstone's/Ottakar's to 
compete against their B&M rivals and to respond to the 'pincer 
movement', described in paragraph's 6.4-6.8, caused by intense 
supermarket and internet competition. Interpreting this merger as a direct 
response to the growing presence of entrants, it can be argued 
persuasively that this is an indirect consequence of abolition.  
10.5 On the other hand, the main effects of product innovation are probably 
not so well captured by the methodology.122 Indeed, it is difficult to 
envisage how a project such as this could undertake an exhaustive 
evaluation of the impact of the intervention on product innovation. This 
would perhaps entail identifying some key product innovations, and then 
assessing how, if at all, abolition had influenced their introduction. In 
principle, one might compare with a counterfactual such as Germany, 
but the problems in comparing the quality of the product across 
countries are obvious: realistically, direct objective comparisons of the 
quality of books or bookshops between the UK and Germany are largely 
impossible. 
10.6 A recent report for the European Commission (European Commission 
(2004b)) provides examples of both product innovations, for example e-
books, and process innovations, for example digital printing. It suggests 
that, generally, publishing innovations have been largely incremental in 
recent years. The more radical innovations, notably deriving from the 
internet, were from outside the book industry, narrowly defined, and 
were global. Clearly, those innovations were unrelated to abolition of 
NBA. 
10.7 In the same report, the Commission discusses some of the difficulties in 
measuring innovation in the publishing sector in the light of a lack of 
                                     
122 In principle, product enhancement would be included if the price index used to deflate 
turnover represented quality-adjusted price (QAP).  In that case, product enhancement would 
mean a reduction in QAP, and, for a given turnover in nominal terms, an increase in the 
quality adjusted volume (and thus productivity.)  However, we have no reason for thinking 
that any of the price indices available are based on quality adjusted prices. 
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available data. It concludes by proposing a potential methodology which 
would require the collection of new survey evidence, which is clearly 
beyond the scope of the present report. 
10.8 Nevertheless, there is some piecemeal evidence on quality and 
innovation post 1997. In a recent consumer survey of UK book buyers, 
store location and range of titles available were cited as the consumers' 
primary concerns.123 It is therefore pertinent to recall our Figure 6.2, 
which demonstrates that the number of titles in the UK has continued to 
increase rapidly over time. This appears to be in contrast to the evidence 
from Germany where the number of new titles produced has remained 
constant in recent years (see Figure 9.13). See also Table 9.12, which 
provides additional evidence of the relative strength of UK publishing 
compared to Germany.   
10.9 Moreover, the above survey found a high level of consumer satisfaction 
in the UK. Whilst direct information on the range of books available over 
time is not available, there is evidence of substantial increases, 1993–
2001, in the aggregate retail floor space provided by the major B&M 
retailers.124 This presumably reflects increases, in those years, in both 
the number of stores and typical store size – both of which should be 
consumer welfare enhancing. Choice and variety have also undoubtedly 
been enhanced by the emergence of internet selling for the US figures 
show Amazon stocks over 3.4m books and around 25 per cent of its 
book sales come from titles not available in traditional offline stores.125 
10.10 In summary, notwithstanding any limitations due to data unavailability, it 
is incontestable that the major innovations in the book sector in recent 
years have been as a (direct or indirect) consequence of the emergence 
                                     
123 GfK NOP (2006).   
124 Davies et al (2004), p.44 Table 4.7.  
125 Anderson (2007), p.23.  
  
  
OFT981 93 
 
 
of the internet and supermarkets. The methodology we have pursued in 
this report captures some, but not all, of the impact.        
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APPENDIX 1 
The two cases described in paragraph's 5.2-5.9 can be illustrated with a simple 
duopoly example of productivity growth between periods 1 and 2.  
Case 1:  
 Period 1 Period 2 
 Productivity  Market share Productivity  Market share 
Firm 1  100 ½ 110 ½ 
Firm 2 110 ½ 120 ½ 
 
In case one each firm grows by 10 points and maintains market shares of ½.  
 
Within firm effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 using 
period 2 market share weights i.e.:  
period 1: ((1/2)*(100))+((1/2)*(110))=105 
period 2: ((1/2)*(110))+((1/2)*(120))=115 
Change: 10    
Between firm effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 
using period 1 productivity levels and varying the market share weights:  
period 1: ((1/2)*(100))+((1/2)*(100))=100 
period 2: ((1/2)*(100))+((1/2)*(100))=100 
Change: 0 
 
There is therefore no between firm productivity effect and the aggregate change 
is 15.   
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Case 2:  
 Period 1 Period 2 
 Productivity  Market share Productivity  Market share 
Firm 1  100 ½ 100 ¼ 
Firm 2 110 ½ 110 ¾ 
 
In case 2 each firm's productivity level remains constant, however firm 2 
(because of its higher level of productivity) increases its market shares to ¾ in 
period 2.  
Within firm effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 using 
period 2 market share weights i.e.:  
period 1: ((1/4)*(100))+((3/4)*(110))=107.5 
period 2: ((1/4)*(100))+((3/4)*(110))=107.5 
Change: 0   
Between firm effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 
using period 1 productivity levels and varying the market share weights:  
period 1: ((1/2)*(100))+((1/2)*(110))=105 
period 2: ((1/4)*(100))+((3/4)*(110))=107.5 
Change: 2.5 
 
There is therefore no within firm productivity effect and the aggregate change is 
2.5.  
• In case 1 there was only a within firm effect as market shares 
remain constant across periods (whilst productivity levels change).  
 
• In case 2 there was only a between firm effect as productivity levels 
remain constant across periods (whilst productivity levels change). 
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Combining cases 1 and 2:  
 
Case 3:  
 Period 1 Period 2 
 Productivity  Market share Productivity  Market share 
Firm 1  100 ½ 110 ¼ 
Firm 2 110 ½ 120 ¾ 
 
In case 3 both productivity levels vary between periods:  
 
Aggregate effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 using 
varying market share weights i.e.:  
period 1: ((1/2)*(100))+((1/2)*(110))=105 
period 2: ((1/4)*(110))+((3/4)*(120))=117.5 
Change: 12.5  
 
 Within firm effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 
using period 2 market share weights i.e.:  
period 1: ((1/4)*(100))+((3/4)*(110))=107.5 
period 2: ((1/4)*(110))+((3/4)*(120))=117.5 
Change: 10  
 
Between firm effect: calculates the change in productivity from period 1 to 2 
using period 1 productivity levels and varying the market share weights:  
period 1: ((1/2)*(100))+((1/2)*(110))=105 
period 2: ((1/4)*(100))+((3/4)*(110))=107.5 
Change: 2.5 
 
There is therefore both a within and between firm productivity effect and the 
aggregate change is given by the sum of these two effects.  
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APPENDIX 2 
Company Type 
Number of 
Store 
(For last year 
available) 
Established 
Exit/ 
 acquired by 
Waterstone's 
Specialist 
bookseller 
186 (excl 
Ottakars) 
1982 
WHSmith 1989-
1998 
Ottakars 
Specialist 
bookseller 
142 1987 
Waterstone's 
2006 
Borders Diversified chain 72 1997 
Recently sold by 
Borders US. 
WHSmith Diversified chain 753 1792 / 
Blackwells 
Book chain & 
publishers (until 
2007) 
56 1879 / 
British 
Bookshops 
Specialist 
bookseller 
53 1976 
Eason & Son 
(Eire) 
David Flatman 
Specialist 
bookseller 
50 1982 
27 stores by The 
Works 2007 
John Smiths 
Specialist 
bookseller 
29 1751 / 
W Heffer 
Specialist 
bookseller 
2 1909 Blackwells 1999 
Magma 
Independent 
specialist niche 
bookseller 
1 2000 / 
The Works 
Diversified chain 
(mainly books) 
250 1981 / 
Sameday 
Books 
Specialist 
bookseller 
5 1993 / 
Galloway & 
Porter 
Independent 
specialist bookseller 
1 1902 / 
W & G Foyle 
Specialist 
bookseller 
4 1903 / 
Information from Verdict (2007), Mintel (2007) and company websites etc.  
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APPENDIX 3 
Year 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
UK 
Rets 
7 7 6 6 6 7 7 11 12 11 9 10 11 12 12 12  
UK 
Pubs 
0 24 25 27 28 28 36 39 43 45 44 46 46 48 48 47 21 
German 
Pubs 
      19 22 21 23 15 30 31 25 30 29 22 
German 
Rets 
      12 13 15 19 25 41 43 34 41 43 30 
NB Data not collected for Germany pre 1996 due to unavailability of price data 
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APPENDIX 4 
Turnover 
(th €) 
(latest year data 
available) 
UK 
Retailers 
German 
Retailers 
UK 
Publishers 
 
German 
Publishers 
1,000,000 +    1 
250,000 -999,999 3  3 2 
100,000 – 249,999 3 4 6 4 
50,000 – 99,999 1 4 9 3 
25,000 – 49,999 2 7 9 11 
0 – 24,999 5 38 22 20 
TOTAL 14 53 49 41 
 
Number of Employees 
(latest year data 
available) 
UK 
Retailers 
German 
Retailers 
UK 
Publishers 
 
German 
Publishers 
10,000 +    1 
5,000 – 9,999     
2,500 – 5,000 2    
1,000 – 2,499 3 3 3 2 
500 – 999 1 4 6 3 
100 – 500 4 16 18 15 
50 -99 2 15 10 10 
25 – 49 1 11 22 1 
10 – 24 1 4  9 
1 – 9     
TOTAL 14 53 49 41 
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APPENDIX 5 
This Appendix provides detail of the robustness check reported in paragraph's 
8.2-8.13:  
 
Sub-period 1: 1990–96 
Unfortunately, AMADEUS reports data for every year in the period up to 1996, 
for only 4 of these 14 firms (although they are each major players, see Table 
8.5).  Figure A5.1 shows the aggregate productivity of just these four firms, and 
fortunately it shows that the earlier picture for 1990–1996 as shown in Figure 
8.8 is confirmed, and is not just an artefact of an unbalanced sample.  
 
Figure A5.1: Real labour productivity, 1990–96 (reduced sample) 
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Sub-period 2: 1997–2005 
In the second sub-period, we have a choice of three alternative samples of 
firms, each of which is internally balanced:126 
 
a. the four firms listed above 
b. these four firms plus two new entrants, Borders and Waterstone's (now 
divested from WHSmith) 
c. the six firms in (b) plus another three firms for which complete data are 
available for 1997–2005, but not before.   
 
Figure A5.2 plots aggregate productivity for each (combining samples b) and c) 
as the results were indistinguishable). 
 
Figure A5.2: Real labour productivity, 1997–2005 (various samples) 
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As can be seen, the addition of Waterstone's and Borders reduces the extent of 
the decline in productivity, while the three additional (significantly smaller 
                                     
126 In order to get these balanced samples turnover and employee data were interpolated using 
the average of the previous and next years values in order to estimate four missing values 
(not included in Appendix 3). 
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firms)127 added from sample b to c make virtually no difference. Borders' entry 
to the market in 1997 arguably would not have occurred had the fixed price 
regime continued. 
 
                                     
127 As they have a small share of total employment (see paragraph's 5.2-5.9 equation 
(1)).  
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APPENDIX 6 
VARIABLE WEIGHTS          
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
Waterstone's 14 0.72 16 0.79 16 0.81 16 0.72 16 0.82 
Ottakar's 8 0.57 7 0.62 6 0.67 5 0.70 6 0.90 
WH Smith, Borders & Blackwell 19 0.64 20 0.65 20 0.67 20 0.71 18 0.73 
Other Specialists 11 0.52 11 0.57 10 0.59 10 0.62 14 0.70 
Supermarkets 8 2.15 6 2.15 5 2.15 4 2.15 4 2.15 
Internet 12 2.15 9 2.15 8 2.15 7 2.15 5 2.15 
Others 28 0.52 31 0.57 35 0.59 38 0.62 37 0.70 
PRODUCTIVITY  90.34  86.55  84.80  82.77  86.58 
          
END PERIOD (2005) WEIGHTS          
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
Waterstone's 14 0.72 14 0.79 14 0.81 14 0.72 14 0.82 
Ottakar's 8 0.57 8 0.62 8 0.67 8 0.70 8 0.90 
WHSmith, Borders & Blackwell 19 0.64 19 0.65 19 0.67 19 0.71 19 0.73 
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Other Specialists 11 0.52 11 0.57 11 0.59 11 0.62 11 0.70 
Supermarkets 8 2.15 8 2.15 8 2.15 8 2.15 8 2.15 
Internet 12 2.15 12 2.15 12 2.15 12 2.15 12 2.15 
Others 28 0.52 28 0.57 28 0.59 28 0.62 28 0.70 
PRODUCTIVITY  90.34  93.98  95.40  96.50  102.82 
           
 
 
          
START PERIOD (2001) PRODUCTIVITY         
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
MS 
(%) 
Productivity 
Waterstone's 14 0.82 16 0.82 16 0.82 16 0.82 16 0.82 
Ottakar's 8 0.90 7 0.90 6 0.90 5 0.90 6 0.90 
WH Smith, Borders & Blackwell 19 0.73 20 0.73 20 0.73 20 0.73 18 0.73 
Other Specialists 11 0.70 11 0.70 10 0.70 10 0.70 14 0.70 
Supermarkets 8 2.15 6 2.15 5 2.15 4 2.15 4 2.15 
Internet 12 2.15 9 2.15 8 2.15 7 2.15 5 2.15 
Others 28 0.70 31 0.70 35 0.70 38 0.70 37 0.70 
PRODUCTIVITY  102.82  95.61  92.48  89.36  86.58 
 NB firm productivity levels deflated using RPI books index (1989=100)  
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APPENDIX 7 
Estimating production functions and TFP   
The analysis in the main text is confined to just labour productivity, but as 
mentioned, in principle, this methodology can be applied for any measure of 
productivity, including TFP (total factor productivity). As part of our research 
effort, we have indeed explored using TFP, but for a variety of reasons, this has 
proved impracticable. 
 
This Appendix enumerates some of these problems and presents a few results.  
However, we do not believe that these results merit inclusion in the main text, 
given some of the approximations involved. 
 
TFP can be viewed as a measure of the productivity growth of all factors of 
production (and not just labour), where the contributions of the various factors 
are weighted. At its simplest, it is confined to just labour and capital, where the 
weights attached to the two are derived from the elasticities of production with 
respect to the factors. In practice, these are approximated by the factor shares 
in value added,128 making assumptions about the nature of the production 
function and competition in the factor and product markets. More generally, we 
would also wish to include other factors – in this case, probably floor space if 
this is not appropriately accounted for in capital stock data. 
 
Unfortunately, in the present case, this proves to be impossible for Germany 
because our main data source, AMADEUS, includes capital stock information 
typically only for the UK. Even for the UK, AMADEUS reports (from company 
accounts) information on only labour and capital, sometimes, but not usually 
distinguishing intangible and tangible assets.  It also includes some information 
from which we might estimate labour’s share in value added, although just how 
                                     
128 See OFT (2007) Annex A, for a fuller discussion of TFP and some of the issues involved in 
estimation thereof. 
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much consistency there is across firms in definitions of variables is not 
altogether clear. 
 
To summarise then, it would be possible to calculate the growth of TFP for 
individual UK firms only which would mirror the estimates on labour productivity 
described in the main text. But these would be based only on labour and capital, 
and with some uneasiness about the quality of the data for capital. 
 
Putting aside practical data availability issues, however, there is a second set of 
reasons for caution. As mentioned, estimating the weights to be attached to 
capital and labour, in the absence of any other information (as here) requires 
certain assumptions. Most importantly: Constant returns to scale in a Cobb-
Douglas production function Marginal productivity factor pricing, which, in turn, 
requires all three markets (labour, capital and the product) to be perfectly 
competitive. 
 
Since neither of these assumptions should be made without justification, our 
preferred solution would be to use the data available to estimate the production 
function for both publishing and retailing separately, and to recover estimates of 
the elasticities of production from the result. This is certainly feasible in the 
present context, at least for the publishers and B&M retailers, of which we have 
a panel across firms and over years. However, at this point, we encounter a 
third problem. As is well known from the vast literature on estimating 
production and cost functions, care is required to ensure that one identifies the 
production function (as opposed to the factor demand equations) and to avoid 
simultaneous bias (not only does labour affect output, but the reverse is also 
true in the labour demand equation. As is also well known, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, although relatively undemanding in its data requirements, is 
highly restrictive in the assumptions made about factor substitutability. Ideally, 
these should be tested by first estimating more general function forms such as 
the translog, VES or CES production functions. Moreover, estimation using 
frontier techniques, rather than OLS, is preferable under most circumstances.  
An adequate treatment of all of these various problems requires data on more 
variables – crucially, including appropriate instruments – which are unfortunately 
not available from AMADEUS.   
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In a larger scale project, with more time, this might be pursued with more rigour, 
but in the present context, we confine ourselves to a limited bout of 
experimentation on the UK data, in unbalanced panel form for up to 14 years   
and 14 firms for retail and y firms for publishing. Unavoidably, we assume the 
Cobb-Douglas form, but without the restriction of constant returns to scale. We 
include a time trend to capture industry wide improvements in technology, this 
reflects TFP at the aggregate level, and, for individual firms at each point in 
time, the recovered residuals provide estimates of firm-specific TFP.  
   
KLTY o lnlnln 321 ββββ +++=       (A1) 
Where Y  is real value added, T is a time trend (1989-2005 for retail and 1991-
2006 for publishing) representing disembodied technical progress, L  is number 
of employees and K  is real capital assets. All variables are measured in logs. 
 
Table A1 reports the result of estimating (A1) for both publishing and retailing 
on unbalanced samples of 14 and 49 firms respectively. However, given the 
above qualifications, particularly regarding identification and possible 
simultaneous bias, they are best treated as exploratory descriptive regressions. 
 
Table A1: Estimated production functions for publishing and retailing 
Estimator:  
random effects  
Retail Publishing 
   
Constant -46.44** 
(2.89) 
-96.25** 
(6.69)    
T 0.0236** 
(2.93) 
0.0505** 
(7.03)    
lnL 0.585** 
(10.49) 
0.767** 
(9.69)    
lnK 0.147** 
(4.16) 
0.173** 
(4.81)    
Corrected R2 0.877 0.681 
N 125 320 
t values in brackets, ** indicates significant at the five per cent level 
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Interpretation 
Taking the results at face value, for retail, they suggest decreasing returns to 
scale129 and a rate of technical change of 2.36 per cent p.a. For publishing, 
there also appears to be decreasing returns to scale130 and a rate of technical 
change of 5.05 per cent p.a. 
 
While it should be stressed again that these equations should be viewed only as 
exploratory and descriptive, the possibility of decreasing returns deters us from 
computing TFP as the weighted sums of the growth in labour and capital, with 
weights the labour and capital shares in value added – the weights will not add 
up to unity.  If one accepts the estimates at face value, they suggest that, for 
retail, there was significant technical change, but this fails to show up in our 
estimates of within-firm productivity growth in the text because firms suffered 
from decreasing returns to scale.  For publishing, within-firm productivity growth 
is more substantial, and any marginal tendency for decreasing returns will only 
have slightly dampened this.  
 
 
 
                                     
129  Returns to scale is given by the sum of the exponents on Lln  and Kln .  For retail, this is 
0.732, and a chi-squared test confirms that this is less than unity – at the 99 per cent level 
we can be confident that there are decreasing returns to scale. 
130  For publishing, the sum of the exponents on Lln  and Kln  is 0.940 – less than unity but a 
chi-squared test does not allow us to reject the null of unity, so we can not be  95 per cent 
confident that there are not constant returns to scale. 
